Brinkman v. Summit Fire Protection Co.

Background

Kimberly Brinkman, a sprinkler-fitter journeyman, sued her union, Sprinkler Fitters Local #417, and two previous employers, Summit Fire Protection Co. and Gilbert Mechanical Contractors Inc. She alleged sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the federal employment-discrimination law. She alleged that the discrimination left her without work for a period of years.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s authority to hear a case, while a Rule 12(b)(6) motion argues that the complaint does not adequately state a legal claim. The defendants argued that some allegations had not been presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and that the lawsuit was filed too late. Summit and Local 417 argued that the filing deadline deprived the court of jurisdiction. Gilbert joined Summit’s motion and separately sought partial dismissal of the sex-discrimination claim and complete dismissal of the retaliation claim against Gilbert.

Filing deadline

The defendants argued that Brinkman had only 90 days after receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter to file her federal lawsuit. Brinkman filed on the 91st day, but the 90th day was Sunday, November 24, 2019, so she filed on the following Monday, November 25. The court applied the federal rule that extends a deadline falling on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday to the next non-weekend, non-holiday day. Because the defendants acknowledged that the law was unsettled and cited no Eighth Circuit decision preventing application of that rule, the court found that Brinkman’s complaint was timely.

Sex-discrimination claims

Title VII requires a plaintiff to present a discrimination claim to the EEOC before bringing the claim in court. The court explained that the court complaint may restate the EEOC charge liberally, but it may not add allegations so different that the EEOC and the defendant lacked notice of the alleged conduct. The court also noted that a Title VII discrimination charge generally must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful event.

Local 417. Brinkman’s EEOC charge alleged that Local 417 discriminated against her by failing to file a grievance about discrimination at a Gilbert worksite at Gustavus Adolphus College. The collective bargaining agreement limited Local 417’s work with employers to six counties, and Gustavus Adolphus was in Nicollet County, which was not covered. Brinkman’s complaint acknowledged that the project was within another union local’s jurisdiction. The court therefore questioned why Local 417 could be liable for failing to file a grievance it had no authority to file.

The court also held that claims concerning the Gustavus Adolphus project or other conduct before March 2017 should have been brought in Brinkman’s earlier lawsuits. The complaint identified other alleged grievances against Local 417 but did not say when they occurred, and the allegations were not included in Brinkman’s EEOC charge. The court held that the claims against Local 417 had to be dismissed.

Gilbert. Brinkman’s August 2, 2017 EEOC charge alleged that Gilbert’s discrimination occurred from August 2016 through November 11, 2016, but described no conduct after her October 6 layoff. The court found that two allegations in the complaint were not properly presented to the EEOC. One concerned an alleged 2015 firing after Brinkman was told that the quota for female and diverse workers had been met; the court found that allegation time-barred and absent from the EEOC charge. The other concerned alleged discrimination at Gilbert’s YWCA worksite in August 2016; the EEOC charge mentioned the job but did not describe discriminatory conduct that would have alerted the EEOC to investigate it. The court dismissed that portion of the sex-discrimination claim.

The court allowed the sex-discrimination allegation concerning Gilbert’s Gustavus Adolphus College project in fall 2016 to continue because it was the only timely allegation included in the EEOC charge and Gilbert had not sought dismissal of that portion. The court granted Gilbert’s motion as to Brinkman’s sex-discrimination claim arising from anything other than conduct at the Gustavus Adolphus worksite in 2016.

Summit. Brinkman’s EEOC charge against Summit described alleged discrimination at the Minnesota Capitol and US Bank Stadium projects. At the Capitol project, she alleged that she received apprentice-level work while male apprentices received journeyman-level work, lacked necessary tools and had to work alone, and experienced degrading conduct from coworkers. She also alleged that she advocated for other women who complained about discrimination.

Brinkman further alleged that, after she returned to the Capitol project, supervisor Steve Sangren told her that the men did not respect her and said conditions likely would not change. She told Sangren that she would file an EEOC complaint if he did not address the discrimination. Three days later, on March 18, 2016, Sangren laid her off, saying they were caught up on the project and that, given what was happening, it was probably best. Brinkman alleged that Summit had not given her additional work since then.

The court held that these allegations sufficiently stated a preliminary claim of sex discrimination based on Summit’s conduct at the Capitol project in 2016. It therefore denied Summit’s motion as to that conduct.

Retaliation claims

For a Title VII retaliation claim, Brinkman had to allege that she engaged in protected activity—such as opposing unlawful discrimination or filing an EEOC charge—and that the protected activity caused an adverse employment action.

Local 417. Brinkman’s EEOC charge made a broad allegation that she had been excluded from Local 417 jobs and that gender-based discrimination and harassment continued. The court found that allegation too general to state a retaliation claim. The complaint’s allegation that Local 417 gave her no work from 2017 through June 2019 was not properly presented in the EEOC charge. The charge did describe complaints to Local 417 in October 2016 and a lawsuit filed that same month, but the court held that claims based on those events should have been brought in the earlier lawsuit. Local 417’s motion was granted as to the retaliation claim.

Gilbert. The court found that Brinkman did not allege that Gilbert knew about any protected activity. Her EEOC charge referred generally to retaliation by Local 417 and other companies but did not mention Gilbert or explain why Gilbert should have known about her prior complaints, EEOC charges, or lawsuits. She also did not allege that protected activity led to an adverse employment action by Gilbert. The court granted Gilbert’s motion as to the retaliation claim.

Summit. Brinkman alleged that Summit retaliated against her at the Capitol and US Bank Stadium projects because she objected to gender-based hostility and had filed earlier EEOC charges. The court found those allegations, including a supervisor’s alleged “sue-happy bitch” comment, insufficiently connected to an actionable retaliation claim based on earlier lawsuits involving other companies.

However, the court held that Brinkman adequately alleged a retaliation claim based on her complaint to Sangren about discrimination at the Capitol project and her layoff three days later. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, those allegations were sufficient to proceed. Summit’s motion on the retaliation claim was therefore granted in part and denied in part.

Disposition

Judge Paul A. Magnuson ordered that Local 417’s motion to dismiss was granted, Gilbert’s partial motion to dismiss was granted, and Summit’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.