David Bishop v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.

Background

David Bishop alleged that St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongfully terminated him in violation of public policy. Bishop had worked for St. Jude since 1999 and alleged that he had transverse myelitis, a condition causing significant pain. He claimed that, after a confrontation with his supervisor during an August 2016 work conference, the company treated his statements about quitting as a resignation even though he repeatedly said he wanted to remain employed.

Bishop initially pursued claims against Abbott and his former supervisor after Abbott acquired St. Jude Medical, Inc. and its subsidiaries. The case was transferred to the District of Minnesota based on an employment-agreement forum-selection clause. The court later granted Abbott judgment on the pleadings and allowed Bishop to file the Third Amended Complaint naming St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. as the defendant.

Motion to Dismiss

St. Jude moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. It argued that Bishop failed to exhaust FEHA’s administrative requirements, that his common-law wrongful-termination claim was untimely, and that his declaratory-relief claim duplicated his other claims.

The court rejected St. Jude’s argument that Bishop failed to exhaust his administrative remedies merely because he did not specifically name St. Jude in his 2017 complaint to California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The administrative complaint named Abbott and Bishop’s supervisor, identified the same Sylmar, California address, and described the employer’s alleged conduct. The court concluded that these allegations sufficiently identified St. Jude as Bishop’s former employer because Bishop had mistakenly believed Abbott had become his employer. The court therefore denied dismissal of Count VI, the FEHA discrimination claim, on exhaustion grounds.

The court dismissed Count I, the FEHA harassment claim, because Bishop alleged no actionable harassment within the one-year period before his administrative complaint. The court also dismissed the part of Count IV based on failure to prevent harassment. But the court concluded that Bishop’s alleged discharge occurred within the relevant period for the part of Count IV based on failure to prevent discrimination, so that part was not dismissed on the exhaustion ground.

The court dismissed Count II, the FEHA interactive-process claim, and Count III, the FEHA reasonable-accommodation claim, because the alleged accommodation-related conduct occurred in August 2016, more than one year before Bishop filed his administrative complaint. The court declined to apply the continuing-violations doctrine because Bishop alleged no related conduct during the required period.

The court rejected St. Jude’s argument that Count V, the common-law wrongful-termination claim, was untimely. Although Bishop filed the Third Amended Complaint more than two years after his termination, the court concluded that the amendment related back to his original complaint under Rule 15(c). The court treated Bishop’s belief that Abbott had become his employer as a mistake about the proper party’s identity rather than a deliberate decision to sue the wrong entity.

The court dismissed Count VII, which sought declaratory relief, because it merely duplicated Bishop’s other FEHA claims. The final order states that Counts I, II, III, and VII were dismissed with prejudice and that the portion of Count IV alleging failure to prevent harassment was dismissed with prejudice.

Motion to Strike

St. Jude also moved under Rule 12(f) to strike paragraph 41 of the Third Amended Complaint. The court agreed that the paragraph was irrelevant because its allegations about St. Jude’s counsel and the timing of St. Jude’s legal position would not affect the claims’ resolution. But the court denied the motion to strike because St. Jude did not show that leaving the paragraph in the complaint would prejudice it.

Disposition

Judge Nancy E. Brasel granted in part and denied in part St. Jude’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike. The order dismissed the specified claims with prejudice, left other claims in the case, and denied the motion to strike paragraph 41.