Dianna L. B. v. Saul
- Tony Leung
- 0:19-cv-02561
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 14
Dianna L. B. v. Saul: Judge Leung granted disability claimant’s motion, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded for further proceedings.
Dianna L. B.’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits was sent back to the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration at steps four and five; the order did not directly award benefits.
What happened
In Dianna L. B. v. Saul, the claimant challenged the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits. The administrative law judge found she could work despite traumatic brain injury, mental-health conditions, and right-eye vision loss.
The court ruled that the administrative law judge had not adequately explained why he discounted opinions from the claimant’s treating psychologist and psychiatrist. Because the residual-capacity finding was not supported by enough evidence, the court sent the matter back for reconsideration.
Judge Tony N. Leung granted the claimant’s summary-judgment motion, denied the Commissioner’s motion, vacated the Commissioner’s decision at steps four and five, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The detailed version
- Dianna L. B. v. Saul · No. 0:19-cv-02561
- Tony Leung
- Aug. 10, 2020
Background
Dianna L. B. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. She alleged disability beginning October 20, 2016, based on traumatic brain injury, right-eye blindness, anxiety, and depression.
The administrative law judge found severe impairments including traumatic brain injury, persistent depressive disorder, specific anxiety disorder, carotid arterial disease, and ischemic optic neuropathy with right-eye vision loss. The administrative law judge found that these impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. The judge determined that Dianna L. B. had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her limitations—to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to restrictions such as no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no exposure to unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; avoiding work requiring depth perception or a field of vision; and performing only simple, routine, repetitive tasks that were not at a production-rate pace.
The administrative law judge concluded that she had no past relevant work but could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including laundry worker and sealing machine operator. The Commissioner therefore denied benefits. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to decide the case based on the administrative record.
Court’s Analysis
The court reviewed whether the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, meaning enough evidence that a reasonable person could find adequate. The court focused on the treatment of opinions from psychologist Leah Holmes and psychiatrist Dr. Kathryn Lombardo, who described significant limits in Dianna L. B.’s ability to sustain full-time work, maintain attention and concentration, follow schedules, attend regularly, and complete a normal workday and workweek.
The court concluded that the administrative law judge’s reasons for discounting Dr. Lombardo’s opinion were not supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge relied partly on a Global Assessment of Functioning score and general references to mental-status examinations, but did not identify specific records or explain how they supported the decision. The court stated that the administrative law judge needed to address evidence showing both limitations and favorable findings rather than referring generally to the record.
The court also found that the administrative law judge overstated Dr. Lombardo’s view about the cause of fatigue. Dr. Lombardo had not attributed the fatigue entirely to the traumatic brain injury, and the administrative law judge did not address records documenting fatigue when sleep was only mildly impaired. The court further found that the administrative law judge did not explain why neurophysiological testing from several years earlier showed the claimant’s condition during the relevant period.
The court likewise found that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain the rejection of Holmes’s opinions. The restriction to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks addressed only some of Holmes’s concerns and did not account for her opinion that Dianna L. B. would eventually be unable to perform accurately or interact effectively.
The court did not decide the claimant’s additional arguments that the record supported more work-preclusive limitations or that the administrative law judge failed to consider her work history when assessing credibility. Because the case was being sent back for reconsideration beginning at step four, the court stated that those matters should be considered on remand.
Disposition
The court granted Dianna L. B.’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. It vacated the Commissioner’s decision as to steps four through five and remanded the case to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Judge Tony N. Leung signed the order. The opinion did not award benefits directly.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.