Hudock v. LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.

Background

This class action concerns LG televisions that plaintiffs say were advertised as having refresh rates of 120Hz or 240Hz, although their native refresh rates were allegedly 60Hz or 120Hz. The named plaintiffs purchased the televisions from Best Buy stores or websites. They asserted consumer-protection, unjust-enrichment, warranty, and contract claims against LG and Best Buy.

The court had previously certified damages classes for several claims but had not certified classes for the warranty and contract claims or for injunctive relief. At the time of this order, the class claims were Count I under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act, Count III under the Minnesota Uniform Unlawful Trade Practices Act, Count IV under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, and Count XIII for unjust enrichment. The named plaintiffs also pursued Counts II, V through XII, including claims under Minnesota, California, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania statutes, as well as warranty and contract claims.

Summary judgment

Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact important to the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court granted defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part.

The court rejected defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ choice-based conjoint analysis could not legally measure benefit-of-the-bargain damages. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ expert used real-world market prices and held the historical quantity of televisions sold constant. The fact that the analysis focused on the defined group of LG televisions covered by the case did not make the damages model legally inadequate. The court therefore denied summary judgment on that ground and, as stated in the opinion, denied summary judgment as to Counts I, III, and IV because the damages model sufficiently calculated benefit-of-the-bargain damages.

The court ruled that the named plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of future harm, which was required for standing to seek injunctive relief. It granted summary judgment on Count II, the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim, and granted summary judgment in part on Counts V and VI, the California Legal Remedies Act and California Unfair Competition Law claims, insofar as those claims sought injunctive relief. The order states that Count II was dismissed with prejudice and that the injunctive-relief portions of Counts V and VI were dismissed with prejudice.

The court denied summary judgment on defendants’ argument concerning Plaintiff Eugene Mannacio because the evidence created a genuine factual dispute about whether he saw the alleged mislabeling. The court also denied summary judgment on the implied-warranty claims because the parties had not adequately addressed whether the warranties were sufficiently conspicuous under the applicable California, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin law. It denied summary judgment on Count XIII, the unjust-enrichment claim, because the relevant New Jersey authority was mixed and the unjust-enrichment claim was asserted for the class while the warranty claims were brought only by the named plaintiffs.

The court also granted summary judgment on its own initiative as to Counts VII and VIII, the Illinois and New York statutory claims, because no named plaintiff remained from either state and those claims had not been certified for the class. The order specifies that Counts VII and VIII were dismissed without prejudice.

Expert-evidence motions

Defendants moved to exclude portions of the testimony and reports of plaintiffs’ experts Steven P. Gaskin and Colin B. Weir, who were involved in the choice-based conjoint damages analysis. The court denied defendants’ motion. It concluded that Gaskin was qualified and that his opinion was useful and reliable enough for admission under the federal expert-evidence rules. The court also concluded that defendants could challenge weaknesses in the analysis through cross-examination and contrary evidence.

Plaintiffs moved to exclude opinions by defendants’ expert Dr. Keith R. Ugone. The court granted that motion in part and denied it in part. It held that Ugone could offer economic criticisms concerning individual purchase factors, supply-side factors, and competition, but he was not qualified to give an opinion about the design of the choice-based conjoint survey. The order states that Ugone was unqualified to opine on the design of the analysis developed by plaintiffs’ expert.

The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to exclude defendants’ expert Dr. Charles A. Poynton. It also denied plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the declaration of Taylor Vander Aarde under the federal disclosure rules. The court found that Vander Aarde had been identified frequently enough in discovery that excluding the declaration was not warranted.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Count II was dismissed with prejudice; Counts V and VI were dismissed with prejudice insofar as they sought injunctive relief; and Counts VII and VIII were dismissed without prejudice. Defendants’ motion to exclude expert testimony was denied. Plaintiffs’ motion concerning Ugone was granted in part and denied in part, while plaintiffs’ motions concerning Poynton and Vander Aarde were denied.