Doe 1 v. Independent School District 31
- Susan Nelson
- 0:20-cv-00226
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 40
In Doe 1 v. Independent School District 31, Judge Nelson denied the District’s motion to dismiss claims involving alleged student sexual abuse and harassment.
The ruling allowed Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2’s five claims against Independent School District 31 to proceed past the pleading stage; it did not resolve the ultimate merits of those claims.
What happened
In Doe 1 v. Independent School District 31, two students sued the school district over alleged sexual exploitation by an assistant principal and harassment that followed his arrest. They asserted claims under Title IX, a federal education anti-discrimination law; Section 1983, a civil-rights statute; and Minnesota negligence laws.
The District argued that the complaint did not include enough facts to support any claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for this stage and found that the students plausibly alleged the District knew or should have known about misconduct, failed to respond adequately, and created or failed to address risks of further harm.
The court denied the District’s motion to dismiss all five claims, allowing the case to continue. Judge Nelson ruled that the students plausibly alleged negligence, Title IX violations, and equal-protection violations under Section 1983, but did not decide whether they will ultimately win.
The detailed version
- Doe 1 v. Independent School District 31 · No. 0:20-cv-00226
- Susan Nelson
- Aug. 14, 2020
Background
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, through their parents or guardians, sued Independent School District 31, doing business as Bemidji Area Schools. They alleged that Brandon Bjerknes, an assistant principal, sexually exploited middle-school students from 2014 through 2017 by posing online as a teenage boy, requesting sexual images, sending explicit material, and engaging in sexual conversations. The complaint alleged that he used District-owned devices and that the District received reports of his inappropriate conduct toward female students.
The plaintiffs also alleged that Doe 1’s mother reported suspected online sexual abuse connected to an adult associated with the school, but the District did not investigate or follow up. After Bjerknes’s arrest, the plaintiffs alleged that the District failed to protect their identities and did not adequately respond to bullying, harassment, and rumors by other students. They alleged emotional distress, physical effects, self-harm by Doe 1, educational harm, and Doe 2’s withdrawal from school.
Claims and Motion
The complaint asserted five counts: a Title IX claim; a claim under Section 1983 alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection guarantee; and claims for general negligence, negligent retention, and negligent supervision under Minnesota law. The District moved to dismiss every count for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. The court declined to consider several documents the District offered outside the complaint, including policies, a sentencing transcript, and a Department of Justice report, because considering them would require weighing evidence against the plaintiffs’ allegations. The court stated that such materials could be considered later on a fuller record, such as at summary judgment or trial.
Negligence Claims
The court denied dismissal of the negligence, negligent-retention, and negligent-supervision claims. Under Minnesota law, a negligence claim requires a duty of care, a breach, an injury, and causation. The court found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a duty based on a possible special relationship between the District and its minor students. It also found that the complaint plausibly alleged that the District’s own conduct—including policies concerning internet monitoring, bullying, harassment, and employee supervision—created a foreseeable risk of injury.
The court rejected the District’s argument that Minnesota law categorically prevents a school from having a special relationship with its students. It explained that whether such a relationship exists depends on the facts. The allegations that the plaintiffs were minors, spent substantial time at school without their parents, used District-owned devices, and reported misconduct to school officials were sufficient at this stage.
The court also rejected dismissal based on Minnesota statutory or common-law governmental immunity. It explained that immunity for policy-level decisions generally requires a fact-based determination and that the District’s entitlement to immunity was not clear from the face of the complaint. The court noted that the District, rather than the plaintiffs, bore the burden of establishing the immunity defense.
Title IX Claim
The court denied dismissal of the Title IX claim. A school district may be liable for student sexual harassment when an official with authority to take corrective action has actual notice of the harassment and responds with deliberate indifference, meaning a response that is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.
The court found that the allegations of prior sexual conduct by Bjerknes, reports to school officials, and Doe 1’s mother’s report of online sexual abuse plausibly supported actual notice. The court stated that the District did not need to have notice of the exact form of abuse before it could be liable. The allegations also plausibly supported deliberate indifference because the District allegedly failed to investigate or take appropriate action.
The court separately found that the alleged post-arrest peer harassment could support a Title IX hostile-environment theory. The complaint alleged that the District failed to protect the plaintiffs’ identities, ignored requests to address harassment, and took actions that contributed to rumors and educational harm. Taken together, those allegations plausibly showed harassment that was severe and offensive enough to interfere with educational opportunities and that the District had notice of the risk and failed to respond adequately.
Section 1983 Claim
The court denied dismissal of the Section 1983 claim. The plaintiffs alleged that District policies, customs, and practices caused violations of their Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection rights. The court explained that a school district may be liable when an official custom or practice causes a constitutional injury, including through a persistent failure to investigate complaints or train employees.
The court found that the alleged reports involving Bjerknes, the earlier alleged misconduct by another District teacher, and the District’s alleged failure to respond plausibly supported a custom or practice of ignoring sexual-harassment complaints. It also found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a failure-to-train theory concerning employee responses to student-on-student harassment and sexual discrimination. The plaintiffs were not relying on automatic employer liability for Bjerknes’s conduct; instead, they alleged that District officials’ own policies, practices, knowledge, and failures caused the constitutional violations.
Disposition
The court denied the District’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [Doc. No. 8]. The order did not decide whether the plaintiffs would prevail after discovery or trial; it held only that the complaint alleged enough facts for all five claims to proceed.
Read the full 40-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.