Minnesota RFL Republican Farmer Labor Caucus v. Freeman

Background

The plaintiffs described themselves as political candidates, political associations, and individuals involved in political activities related to Minnesota elections and campaigns. They sued four Minnesota county attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute allowing claims against state or local officials for violating federal rights. The Minnesota Attorney General’s Office intervened to defend the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 211B.02.

Section 211B.02 prohibits knowingly making a false claim that a candidate or ballot question has the support or endorsement of a major political party, party unit, or organization. It also prohibits stating in written campaign material that a candidate or ballot question has an individual’s support or endorsement without that individual’s written permission. The plaintiffs argued that both sentences violated the First Amendment, including rights involving free speech and expressive association, and that the second sentence imposed an improper prior restraint.

The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing the statute while the case proceeded. The court concluded that the temporary-restraining-order request did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). Because the motion had been noticed, fully briefed, and heard, the court treated it as a motion seeking only a preliminary injunction.

Standing

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, which is the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury connected to the challenged conduct and likely to be remedied by the requested relief. For a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge, a plaintiff generally must show an intention to engage in arguably protected conduct and a credible threat of prosecution.

The court found that the plaintiffs had shown injury-in-fact at this stage. Their declarations described political speech in which they said they would engage but for the chilling effect of § 211B.02. The court also rejected the argument that the absence of criminal prosecutions since the statute’s enactment, and the county attorneys’ statements that they were not investigating violations and had no present intention to begin proceedings, eliminated a credible threat of prosecution. The court noted the statute’s history of administrative proceedings, including one involving a plaintiff, and concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficient reason to fear repercussions from their political speech.

The court also rejected a redressability concern. Although other people could file administrative complaints under the statute, an injunction against the county attorneys could still eliminate the risk of criminal prosecution initiated by those officials and therefore redress part of the alleged injury.

Preliminary-injunction analysis

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. The court considered four factors: the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success, the threat of irreparable harm without an injunction, the balance of harms, and the public interest.

Likelihood of success

The court found that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims against these defendants, but emphasized that this conclusion did not resolve the merits of their First Amendment challenge. Instead, the problem concerned the required connection between the defendants and threatened enforcement under the doctrine associated with Ex parte Young. That doctrine can allow suits for prospective relief against officials who are about to enforce an unconstitutional law.

The court contrasted the earlier pleading-stage decision, which had found that the plaintiffs plausibly identified proper defendants, with the more demanding preliminary-injunction inquiry. At the preliminary-injunction stage, the question was whether these defendants were in fact the proper parties for the requested relief. Based on the defendants’ uncontested declarations that they had never initiated civil or criminal proceedings under § 211B.02, were not currently investigating violations, and had no present intention to begin proceedings, the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown the defendants were about to commence enforcement proceedings against them.

Irreparable harm

The court independently found that the plaintiffs had not shown immediate irreparable harm. The lack of threatened or imminent enforcement was relevant to this factor. The plaintiffs filed the case in July 2019 but waited nearly a year to seek an injunction, did not request expedited briefing, and identified no new circumstance that prompted the request. The court also noted that the plaintiffs’ claims were not tied specifically to the upcoming 2020 general election and that an injunction against the four county attorneys would not prevent complaints filed by other people.

Balance of harms and public interest

The court found that the balance-of-harms factor favored no party. The plaintiffs described chilled political speech, but the defendants stated that they had no present intention to prosecute, and an injunction would not affect many potential complaints by other people. The public-interest factor was also neutral. The court recognized the importance of speech and association rights in political matters, but concluded that those interests were counterbalanced by the interest in avoiding changes to Minnesota election law shortly before the 2020 general election.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The opinion did not decide whether Minn. Stat. § 211B.02 is constitutional under the First Amendment.