Melillo v. Melillo

Background

Keith Melillo applied to proceed without paying the filing fee. The opinion states that he financially qualified for that status, but explains that the court must deny the application and dismiss an action if the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The case arose from domestic disputes between Melillo and his former spouse, Margaret Mee Melillo, also identified as Margaret Cunniff. Melillo alleged that Cunniff physically assaulted him. He also made allegations involving Keith Voegel, the Rice County Sheriff’s Office, the “Faribault Sheriff,” and the Minnesota Department of Motor Vehicles.

Claims and analysis

The court concluded that the alleged fraud involving the Minnesota Department of Motor Vehicles was not described with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). It also concluded that any fraud claim appeared to arise under state law, not federal law.

As to the alleged robbery, the court said the Rice County Sheriff’s Office was not an entity that could be sued. Although a sheriff could potentially be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations, the complaint did not clearly identify which “Faribault Sheriff” was meant or explain what specifically happened. The court found that the one-sentence robbery allegation did not state a plausible § 1983 claim.

Regarding Voegel, Melillo alleged that Cunniff told him Voegel had told her to frame Melillo for criminal offenses. The court said a wholly unsupported arrest might support a § 1983 claim, but Melillo did not allege that he suffered an adverse consequence—such as arrest, detention, or criminal charges—from the alleged scheme. The court also said Melillo could not bring a claim based on Voegel’s failure to prosecute Cunniff because he lacked standing, meaning he was not legally entitled to pursue that claim.

The court found that Melillo’s claims against Cunniff appeared to be based entirely on state law. It said the parties were not diverse in citizenship, so diversity jurisdiction did not apply, and federal-question jurisdiction did not provide a basis for hearing those state-law claims. The court further recommended declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims because it recommended dismissing the federal claims before trial.

Sealing order

The court granted in part and denied in part Melillo’s motion to seal. It ordered the complaint and its addendum sealed because they contained a home address and medical records that could not be separated from the rest of the filings without creating a misleading public record. It ordered all other docket documents unsealed. The clerk was directed to seal docket entries 1, 1-1, and 1-3 and unseal all other docket entries.

Recommendation and procedural status

Judge David T. Schultz recommended that the entire case be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and that Melillo’s application to proceed without paying the filing fee be denied. The document stated that the report and recommendation was not a district-court order or judgment and could not be appealed directly to the Eighth Circuit. It allowed specific written objections within 14 days after service, with a response period of 14 days after service of the objections.