Sultan v. 3M Company

Background

The opinion addresses sixteen related cases brought by more than 500 non-contractor civilians and civilian contractors. The plaintiffs alleged that they used Combat Arms Earplugs, Version 2, designed and manufactured by 3M Company and Aearo Technologies LLC. They alleged that they did not receive instructions to fold back the earplugs’ third flange or a warning that the earplugs would not work properly without doing so. They brought state-law product-liability claims based on failure to warn and alleged hearing loss, tinnitus, or both.

The cases were filed in Minnesota state court. 3M removed them to federal court and asserted several grounds for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs moved to remand, meaning they asked the federal court to return the cases to state court.

Government-Contractor and Combat-Activities Defenses

The court held that its earlier decisions had already determined that the government-contractor defense did not provide federal jurisdiction for failure-to-warn claims like these. The court distinguished decisions from the multidistrict litigation court because those cases involved design-defect claims, either alone or together with failure-to-warn claims, while these plaintiffs alleged only failure to warn.

The court also held that 3M was precluded from asserting the combatant-activities exception because the same issue had been litigated in an earlier case involving 3M, in which the defense was essential to the judgment. The court concluded that neither federal defense supplied a basis for removal.

Federal Enclaves

The court rejected 3M’s argument that the federal-enclave doctrine supported jurisdiction. The doctrine can provide federal jurisdiction over personal-injury claims arising on land that qualifies as a federal enclave, but the court stated that it generally does not apply to military installations on foreign soil.

For Eric Bertrand, the court found that the original 113 acres of NASA’s Plum Brook property qualified as a federal enclave, but 3M had not shown that the additional acreage qualified or that Bertrand’s injuries occurred on the original 113 acres. The court therefore found no federal-question jurisdiction over Bertrand’s claims.

For Forest Taylor, the court recognized that the Naval Battalion Center in Gulfport, Mississippi, was a federal enclave. But Taylor alleged that he first suffered injury in Iraq before later using the earplugs at the Battalion Center. Applying the approach that focuses on where the claim arose, the court concluded that Taylor’s claims did not arise on the federal enclave.

The court also found that 3M had not identified specific federal-enclave locations or established that the doctrine applied to several other plaintiffs’ claims.

Property Clause

3M argued that the Property Clause of Article IV of the Constitution supported federal jurisdiction over claims arising from military installations in Iraq. The court explained that Congress must affirmatively use the Property Clause power before it can create federal-question jurisdiction based on the relevant property or territory.

The court concluded that 3M had not shown that Congress had taken such action concerning military installations in Iraq. Documents from the Coalition Provisional Authority did not establish the required federal basis because that authority derived its power from the laws of war and international law, not from federal law or the Constitution. The Property Clause therefore did not provide jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims arising from those installations.

Admiralty Jurisdiction

3M argued that Gary Martin’s claims arose under federal maritime jurisdiction because he worked on barges on the Hudson River. The court found that the location requirement was satisfied because the alleged injuries occurred on navigable waters. But maritime jurisdiction also requires a substantial relationship between the alleged conduct and traditional maritime activity.

The court held that allegedly supplying earplugs without adequate warnings or instructions did not have that required maritime relationship. The fact that the alleged injury occurred on navigable water was not enough to turn the product-liability claim into a maritime tort.

Disposition

The court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims and granted all sixteen Motions to Remand. The order returned the cases to the state-court system from which they had been removed. The court denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), finding that 3M had a reasonable basis for continuing to assert the government-contractor defense because the issue had not been resolved by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.