Kidd v. Fikes
- Susan Nelson
- 0:20-cv-00287
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 6
In Kidd v. Fikes, Judge Nelson dismissed Kidd’s habeas petition with prejudice, ruling that no additional good-conduct credit was owed, and denied appointed counsel.
Dana Kidd, Jr.; the ruling upheld the Bureau of Prisons’ calculation of his good-conduct credit and denied his request for appointed counsel.
What happened
In Kidd v. Fikes, Dana Kidd challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ calculation of his good-conduct credit under the First Step Act. He argued that the Bureau should also have recalculated credit for his completed 2005 sentence, which he said would provide 70 additional days.
The court agreed that the Bureau correctly calculated credit using Kidd’s later, consecutive 48-month sentence, without including the completed 2005 sentence. The court overruled Kidd’s objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and dismissed the habeas petition with prejudice. It also denied Kidd’s request for appointed counsel because the request had become moot and the interests of justice did not require counsel.
Judge Susan Richard Nelson issued the order on December 7, 2020. The ruling left the Bureau’s calculation of 216 days of projected good-conduct credit in place.
The detailed version
- Kidd v. Fikes · No. 0:20-cv-00287
- Susan Nelson
- Dec. 7, 2020
Background
Dana Kidd, Jr., proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ calculation of his good-conduct credit. Kidd had received a 120-month sentence in 2005 and completed that sentence in 2012. In 2018, he pleaded guilty to violating supervised release and was sentenced to 24 months in prison. He also received another 24-month sentence for conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and mail fraud, with the two later sentences ordered to run consecutively for a total of 48 months.
The Bureau recalculated Kidd’s good-conduct time under the First Step Act of 2018 using only the aggregate 48-month sentence. It projected that Kidd would receive 216 days of good-conduct credit. Kidd argued that the Bureau should also have applied the First Step Act to his completed 2005 sentence, giving him an additional 70 days of credit.
Objection to the Recommendation
A magistrate judge recommended denying the petition and dismissing the action with prejudice. Kidd objected and generally repeated his claim for the additional 70 days. The district court reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation independently.
The court held that Kidd was not entitled to additional good-conduct credit for the completed 2005 sentence. It explained that a sentence imposed after supervised-release revocation is separate and distinct from the original sentence for calculating good-conduct time. Although the later sentence was related to the 2005 sentence because the supervised release arose from that sentence, the First Step Act did not permit Kidd to obtain additional credit based on the completed original sentence.
The court therefore concluded that the Bureau properly applied the First Step Act to Kidd’s aggregate 48-month sentence without considering the initial 120-month sentence.
Motion to Appoint Counsel
Before filing his objection, Kidd moved for appointed counsel, stating that the COVID-19 pandemic had resulted in his transfer to a jail without a law library and that he could not prepare his objection. The court noted that Kidd later filed an objection, making the motion moot. The court also stated that there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in habeas proceedings and found that the interests of justice did not require an appointment. It denied the motion.
Disposition
Judge Susan Richard Nelson overruled Kidd’s objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, dismissed the petition, and denied the Motion to Appoint Counsel. The opinion also states that the matter was dismissed with prejudice.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.