Ivey v. Johnston

Background

Christopher Ivey, a civilly committed resident of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), brought a single-count amended complaint against Nancy Johnston. Ivey alleged that MSOP policies barring clients from using the internet were overly broad and violated his First Amendment rights. He sought an injunction against the ban, a declaration that Johnston’s acts and omissions violated his constitutional rights, an order defining the internet access MSOP could not block, and access to email, social-media websites, and other websites.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnston argued that the evidence showed MSOP’s internet policies were constitutional. Ivey argued that the policies prevented him from using social media, contacting political candidates and elected officials, and obtaining political and news information online.

Legal standard and analysis

The court applied a modified version of the four-factor test from Turner v. Safley that courts in the District of Minnesota use for constitutional claims by civilly committed MSOP clients. The factors ask: (1) whether the policy has a valid, rational connection to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests; (2) whether alternative ways exist to exercise the right; (3) the impact of an accommodation on MSOP, its resources, staff, and other clients; and (4) whether simple and cost-effective alternatives exist that would meet MSOP’s objectives.

The court found that MSOP had legitimate interests in rehabilitation and institutional security. According to the evidence cited by the court, unrestricted internet access could allow some clients to communicate with minors and other vulnerable people, contact victims or victims’ families, plot escapes, stalk or harass others, access counter-therapeutic material, and participate in criminal activity. The court concluded that Ivey had not shown that the ban lacked a rational connection to those interests. The court also noted that Ivey conceded that clients would likely engage in some of the activities the policy seeks to prevent and that unrestricted access could not be provided without risk.

On the second factor, the court found that Ivey had alternative ways to obtain internet information. He had access to mail, telephone service, newspapers, magazines, radio, and some television channels. Friends and family could print internet information and mail it to him, and Ivey’s stepfather had researched information for him. Ivey had also contacted politicians by mail. The court held that Ivey had not shown that the Constitution requires the more convenient access provided by the internet.

On the third and fourth factors, the court found that Ivey had not supported his proposed alternatives with evidence. He suggested limited internet and email access similar to that given to MSOP staff, but staff access was tied to their job duties. He also suggested technology that could allow access to some websites while blocking others, but the evidence stated that no technology existed that would permit real-time monitoring of client communications. Ivey offered no evidence or expert testimony showing that in-person monitoring would not unreasonably burden MSOP. The court found that such monitoring would affect MSOP, its staff, resources, and other clients, and would not prevent certain harmful conduct before it occurred.

The court also addressed Ivey’s continued reliance on Packingham v. North Carolina, explaining that the earlier decision did not apply because Ivey was civilly committed and subject to different standards.

Disposition

The court held that Ivey had not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about the constitutionality of MSOP’s internet policies under the modified Turner test. The court granted Johnston’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Ivey’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and ordered judgment entered accordingly. Judge Paul A. Magnuson signed the memorandum and order on January 13, 2021.