Fosness v. Minnesota Sex Offender Program
- John Tunheim
- 0:20-cv-01511
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 15
In Fosness v. Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Judge Tunheim denied defendants’ dismissal motion, ruling Fosness exhausted her Americans with Disabilities Act claims.
Deanna S. Fosness and the defendants—the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and Jodi Harpstead.
What happened
Deanna S. Fosness v. Minnesota Sex Offender Program concerns Fosness’s claims that defendants failed to accommodate her narcolepsy and retaliated against her, eventually forcing her to resign. She had filed an amended 2017 charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging disability discrimination and continuing retaliation, followed by a 2019 charge concerning her resignation.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss claims based on the 2019 charge, arguing that Fosness had not completed the required administrative process. The court held that the later allegations involved the same or closely related retaliatory acts described in the amended 2017 charge, including the acts Fosness said led to her resignation.
The court denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Judge Tunheim ruled that all allegations in Fosness’s amended complaint had been administratively exhausted and could proceed.
The detailed version
- Fosness v. Minnesota Sex Offender Program · No. 0:20-cv-01511
- John Tunheim
- Feb. 23, 2021
Background
Deanna S. Fosness worked as a Special Teacher at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, a program of the Minnesota Department of Human Services. She alleged that she had narcolepsy and asked to work four 10-hour shifts each week, with a flexible start time, based on her doctor’s recommendations. According to the complaint, the program instead offered four 10.5-hour shifts with a working lunch and no ability to flex her time.
Fosness alleged that, after she requested an accommodation and filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge, her supervisor retaliated by changing her working conditions, limiting professional-development opportunities, denying training requests, and reevaluating her Family and Medical Leave Act status. Fosness alleged that she was forced to resign on March 14, 2019, because of the continued refusal to accommodate her and the continued retaliation.
Fosness filed an initial 2017 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge and amended it in 2018 to include retaliation and continuing action. She later filed a second charge in 2019 concerning her forced resignation. The Department of Justice issued a Notice of Right to Sue for the amended 2017 charge, but had not issued one for the 2019 charge when Fosness filed this case.
Motion to Dismiss
The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a claim for relief. They argued that claims based on the 2019 charge were barred because Fosness had not administratively exhausted them.
For workplace discrimination claims, administrative exhaustion generally requires filing a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receiving a Notice of Right to Sue. A federal complaint may also include allegations that are like or reasonably related to the allegations in the charge, including later retaliatory acts of the same kind when the charge identifies retaliation as ongoing or continuing.
Court’s Analysis
The court found that the amended 2017 charge alleged disability discrimination, retaliation for requesting an accommodation, specific changes in employment conditions, and continuing retaliation. The court concluded that allegations about retaliatory acts occurring before the amendment fell within the period and subjects covered by that amended charge.
The court also concluded that the later alleged retaliatory acts involved the same types of conduct described in the amended 2017 charge. The court treated the continuing-retaliation language in that charge as covering later retaliatory acts of a similar kind.
Finally, the court held that Fosness’s constructive-discharge allegation was exhausted because the retaliatory acts allegedly causing her resignation were the same acts or acts of the same character as those described in the amended 2017 charge. The court found that all allegations in the amended complaint had been administratively exhausted.
Disposition
The court denied defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Judge John R. Tunheim did not decide whether Fosness would ultimately prevail on her Americans with Disabilities Act or Minnesota-law claims; the ruling addressed whether those claims had been administratively exhausted sufficiently to proceed.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.