Driehorst v. Schnell

Background

Cody Driehorst was committed to the custody of the Minnesota Department of Corrections for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. He alleged that the Department suspended in-person visits because of the COVID-19 pandemic, while other inmates at his facility had access to internet-based video visits. Driehorst alleged that he could not have video visits because he is a sex offender and cannot have contact with minors.

The amended complaint asserted broad claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against government officials for certain constitutional violations. Driehorst alleged a constitutional right to equality and freedom from discrimination, claimed he was being singled out because he is a sex offender, and invoked the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. He sought $250,000 in damages and an injunction requiring video visits for himself and “all others similarly situated” in the Department of Corrections.

Court’s analysis

The court considered Schnell’s motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a claim for relief. The court generally treated plausible factual allegations as true but did not accept conclusory statements without supporting facts.

The court held that Driehorst’s Eighth Amendment allegations were insufficient because he did not plausibly allege that being denied video visits was cruel and unusual punishment or made him less safe. The court also rejected his equal-protection theory. It explained that courts have not treated sex offenders as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification and that Driehorst alleged that all sex offenders at his facility were denied video visits, rather than alleging that he was treated differently from other sex offenders.

The court further held that claims against Schnell in his official capacity were barred by sovereign immunity. A claim against a state official in an official capacity is treated as a claim against the state, and the court concluded that Minnesota had not waived or otherwise consented to this suit. The court also stated that Minnesota and Schnell in his official capacity were not “persons” under § 1983.

As to damages against Schnell personally, the court explained that § 1983 liability is based on personal involvement and does not impose liability merely because someone supervises others. Because Driehorst did not allege that Schnell was directly involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the court found that he failed to state a damages claim against Schnell. Schnell also argued that qualified immunity protected him in his personal capacity, but the court stated that qualified immunity was not appropriate at this stage because precedent indicated that the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections could be liable for unconstitutional policies.

The court additionally stated that, even if Driehorst had pleaded a valid claim, his requested injunction would violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That law requires an injunction concerning prison conditions to be narrowly drawn, no broader than necessary to correct the federal-rights violation, and the least intrusive means of doing so. The court found that an order requiring video visits for Driehorst and all other sex offenders was not narrowly drawn.

Disposition

Judge Paul A. Magnuson ordered that Paul Schnell’s motion to dismiss was granted and that the amended complaint was dismissed without prejudice. The court ordered judgment to be entered accordingly.