Stevenson v. Bauer

Background

Soren Stevenson alleged that he participated peacefully in protests in Minneapolis after George Floyd’s death. He alleged that, before an 8:00 p.m. curfew began on May 31, 2020, Minneapolis police officers fired less-lethal projectiles into a peaceful crowd without warning. According to the complaint, one officer fired a 40-millimeter projectile that struck Stevenson in the face, causing extensive damage and ultimately the loss of his left eye.

Stevenson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that permits claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority. He asserted violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants named in the caption included the City of Minneapolis, Medaria Arradondo in his individual and official capacities, and unidentified Minneapolis police officers.

Stevenson alleged that the officers’ conduct violated Minneapolis Police Department policies and resulted from an unofficial department custom that endorsed excessive force against protesters and helped officers avoid accountability. He also alleged that municipal policymakers knew about the conduct and were deliberately indifferent to it or tacitly authorized it.

The City Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against the City and Arradondo. They argued that Stevenson had not adequately pleaded a municipal-liability claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services and had not adequately pleaded an individual-capacity claim against Arradondo.

Court’s analysis

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true, viewed them in Stevenson’s favor, and required the complaint to contain enough facts to make the claims plausible rather than merely possible or speculative.

Municipal-liability claim

A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because it employs an officer who allegedly committed a constitutional violation. Under Monell, municipal liability may arise when an official policy, unofficial custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise causes the constitutional violation.

For an unofficial-custom claim, Stevenson had to plausibly allege a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct; notice of that conduct and deliberate indifference to it or tacit authorization by municipal policymakers; and injury caused by the custom.

The court found the allegations sufficient at the pleading stage. Stevenson identified his own injury, another alleged incident involving a protester named Ethan Marks, and broader allegations about excessive force during the George Floyd protests and in earlier years. The court concluded that these allegations plausibly supported a continuing and widespread pattern of excessive force against protesters. It also found that public comments by municipal policymakers about police use of force and the City Defendants’ own description of the protests supported an inference that policymakers had notice of the alleged conduct.

Although the allegations about the policymakers’ deliberate choice to ignore the conduct were relatively sparse, the court declined to dismiss the claim at this early stage. It held that Stevenson plausibly alleged an unofficial custom endorsing excessive force against peaceful protesters and that the custom was either tacitly authorized by policymakers or met with deliberate indifference. The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the Monell claim.

The court also explained that Stevenson did not assert a separate Monell claim based only on a custom of failing to report uses of force. Instead, he alleged that the reporting failures and the alleged excessive-force custom operated together to cause his injury.

Individual-capacity claim against Arradondo

A supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if the supervisor directly participates in a constitutional violation or if inadequate training or supervision causes the violation. The plaintiff must allege specific facts showing the supervisor’s personal involvement or direct responsibility.

The court held that Stevenson had not plausibly alleged such facts against Arradondo in his individual capacity. Allegations about Arradondo’s enforcement of department policies and discipline after misconduct concerned his official role as police chief, not his personal participation. Stevenson also did not allege that Arradondo personally trained or supervised any of the unidentified officers involved in the shooting. The court therefore found that the complaint did not state an individual-capacity claim against Arradondo and dismissed that claim without prejudice.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. It denied the motion as to Stevenson’s municipal-liability claim and dismissed without prejudice his claim against Arradondo in his individual capacity.