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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 12, 2021

Greene v. Osborne-Leivian

Judge
Eric Tostrud
Docket
0:19-cv-00533
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
42
Civil RightsSection 1983Motion to DismissPro Se
In one sentence

In Greene v. Osborne-Leivian, Judge Tostrud granted defendants’ dismissal motions, denied Greene’s motions, and dismissed claims with different prejudice terms.

Who this affects

Guy I. Greene’s claims against the named state and county officials were dismissed. The order dismissed some official-capacity claims without prejudice and all other claims with prejudice; it also denied Greene’s requests for appointed counsel and his motions objecting to dismissal.

What happened

Guy I. Greene, representing himself, sued employees and officials connected to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, the Minnesota Department of Corrections, and county officials under a federal civil-rights law. He alleged retaliation, unfair treatment and confinement, due-process violations, failure to protect him, and inadequate mental-health care.

The court dismissed Greene’s claims for several reasons, including lack of standing for some official-capacity claims, immunity for officials involved in supervised-release revocation proceedings, and failure to plead enough facts for his remaining claims. The court also declined to appoint counsel.

In Greene v. Osborne-Leivian, Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted both defendants’ motions to dismiss, denied Greene’s motions objecting to dismissal, and denied his motion for appointed counsel. The court dismissed some official-capacity claims without prejudice and all other claims with prejudice.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Greene v. Osborne-Leivian · No. 0:19-cv-00533
Judge
Eric Tostrud
Date
Mar. 12, 2021

Background

Guy I. Greene, proceeding without a lawyer, sued employees of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), the Minnesota Department of Corrections, and other state and county officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued the defendants in their individual and official capacities and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.

The remaining allegations concerned several aspects of Greene’s confinement. He alleged that Tara Osborne-Leivian and other MSOP employees retaliated against him after he complained about staff, transferred him to MSOP’s Behavioral Therapy Unit, and restricted his treatment and release opportunities. He also alleged that officials created or relied on false reports leading to revocation of his supervised release and imprisonment at MCF-Rush City. In addition, he alleged that officials at MCF-Rush City failed to protect him from another inmate and were deliberately indifferent to his mental-health needs. He asserted due-process claims based on his MSOP confinement and retaliation claims based on his complaints and other protected activity.

Appointment of Counsel and Remaining Claims

Greene renewed his request for appointed counsel. The court denied it, finding that he had shown an ability to present his claims and that the factual and legal issues were not sufficiently complex to justify appointing counsel. The court also stated that Greene had already received three opportunities to plead his claims and would not receive another opportunity to amend the complaint.

The court determined that earlier rulings had already dismissed Greene’s claims concerning Crohn’s disease, negligence, medical malpractice, and certain claims against other defendants. It also concluded that no claims remained against Harpstead, Johnston, and Moser. The claims still under consideration included retaliation and deprivation of liberty and due process, failure to protect, and deliberate indifference to mental health.

Reasons for Dismissal

The court dismissed official-capacity claims seeking damages because the Eleventh Amendment bars damages claims against state employees in their official capacities. It also dismissed without prejudice Greene’s official-capacity claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief related to his supervised-release revocation and MCF-Rush City imprisonment. Greene was no longer incarcerated at MCF-Rush City, and the court found that he had not alleged an ongoing violation or a real and immediate threat of future harm there.

The court held that Brent Schmidt, Zach Gahm, Rebecca Holmes-Larson, and HRU Doe were protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their roles in the supervised-release revocation process. The court reasoned that Gahm and HRU Doe acted as hearing officers, Holmes-Larson acted as an executive officer involved in the review process, and Schmidt recommended revocation, presented evidence, and made a recommendation at the hearing. The court found those actions sufficiently connected to the adjudicative process to receive immunity.

The court dismissed under the rule governing failure to state a claim Greene’s allegations that MSOP employees and OSI Doe caused his supervised-release revocation and imprisonment through false reports. Under the rule recognized in Heck v. Humphrey, a civil-rights claim cannot proceed when success would necessarily invalidate a conviction, sentence, or revocation that has not been overturned or otherwise declared invalid. The court found that Greene had not alleged such a favorable termination. The court stated, however, that this rule did not bar claims challenging the conditions of his MCF-Rush City confinement.

The court nevertheless found that Greene had not adequately pleaded his MCF-Rush City claims. For deliberate indifference to mental-health needs, Greene did not allege facts showing that Saari or Fahland actually knew of a serious mental-health risk and deliberately disregarded it. For failure to protect, he did not allege facts showing that Long or Dr. Scherer knew of a substantial risk of serious harm from another inmate and failed to respond reasonably.

The court also rejected Greene’s due-process claims concerning his MSOP placement in the Behavioral Therapy Unit and treatment. Greene did not allege facts showing that the placement created a significant and unusual hardship compared with ordinary MSOP commitment conditions. The court further found that his allegations did not plausibly show constitutionally inadequate procedures, conscience-shocking conduct, a punitive placement, or deliberate indifference to a specific treatment need.

Finally, the court dismissed Greene’s retaliation claims. Although he alleged protected complaints and adverse actions, the court found that he had not plausibly alleged that the defendants acted because of his protected activity. Greene’s own allegations indicated that some actions were based on rule violations, an assault, or pending criminal charges, and his general allegations about falsified reports did not identify a defendant or connect the reports to protected activity.

Order

The court granted Brent Schmidt’s motion to dismiss and granted the Moving State Defendants’ motion to dismiss. It denied Greene’s motions objecting to those dismissal motions and denied Greene’s motion to appoint counsel. The court dismissed without prejudice Greene’s official-capacity claims for damages and his official-capacity claims for injunctive and declaratory relief tied to the supervised-release revocation and MCF-Rush City imprisonment. It dismissed with prejudice all other claims and ordered judgment entered.

The authoritative version

Read the full 42-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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