Levy Armstrong v. City of Minneapolis

Background

The plaintiffs alleged that they peacefully participated in demonstrations following George Floyd’s death. They claimed Minneapolis Police Department officers and Minnesota State Patrol officers used tear gas, rubber bullets, flashbangs, and other less-lethal munitions against protesters without warnings or dispersal orders. The alleged incidents occurred at several Minneapolis locations between May 26 and May 31, 2020. The plaintiffs sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority.

The plaintiffs sued the City of Minneapolis; Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo; Minnesota Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington; Minnesota State Patrol Colonel Matthew Langer; Minneapolis Police Lieutenant Robert Kroll; and unidentified officers. The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim based on its allegations.

City Defendants

The court denied the City defendants’ motion as to the plaintiffs’ municipal-liability claim. Under Monell, a municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an official policy or unofficial custom causes a constitutional violation. The plaintiffs alleged repeated uses of tear gas and less-lethal munitions against peaceful protesters on multiple days and at different locations during the 2020 protests, along with similar incidents in 2015. The court held that these allegations plausibly described a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional force and plausibly alleged that municipal policymakers had notice of, and either tacitly authorized or were deliberately indifferent to, the conduct.

The court dismissed the individual-capacity claims against Arradondo without prejudice. The plaintiffs alleged that he failed to train Minneapolis police officers in the constitutional use of less-lethal munitions and chemical agents, but they did not allege specific facts showing his personal involvement in training or supervising the officers involved. The court found that his position as police chief, by itself, was not enough to establish individual liability.

State Defendants

The court granted the State defendants’ motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against them without prejudice. The complaint alleged that Minnesota State Patrol officers were present at a May 31 protest, fired less-lethal munitions, participated in surrounding protesters, and possibly sprayed Max Fraden with tear gas. But the court found that the allegation that the State Patrol was responsible for Fraden’s injuries was based only on information and belief and was too speculative to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. Because of that conclusion, the court did not decide the State defendants’ additional arguments concerning the Eleventh Amendment, qualified immunity, standing, or supervisory liability.

Kroll

The court denied Kroll’s motion to dismiss. Kroll argued that his challenged conduct occurred in his role as president of the Minneapolis Police Officers Federation, making him a private actor rather than someone acting under state authority. The court held that the complaint plausibly alleged a sufficient connection between Kroll’s position as an Minneapolis police lieutenant and his conduct as Federation president. At the pleading stage, the court would not weigh the evidence about that connection.

The court also rejected Kroll’s argument that the First Amendment barred the claims. The plaintiffs were not asking the court to prohibit Kroll’s speech; they alleged that his speech and conduct promoted excessive force within the police department. The court therefore found that the complaint stated a § 1983 claim against Kroll.

Disposition

Judge Susan Richard Nelson ordered that Kroll’s motion to dismiss was denied; the State defendants’ motion was granted, with the claims against them dismissed without prejudice; and the City defendants’ motion was granted in part and denied in part, with the individual-capacity claims against Arradondo dismissed without prejudice.