Devante D. K. v. Saul

Background

Devante D. K. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. He alleged that he became disabled on November 20, 2016. The administrative law judge found that his schizoaffective disorder was a severe impairment but did not meet the requirements for a listed impairment.

The administrative law judge determined that Devante D. K. had the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his limitations—to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to mental and social restrictions. He could perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but not at a production-rate pace; make only simple work-related decisions; occasionally interact with supervisors and coworkers; and never interact with the public. Because he had no past relevant work, the administrative law judge proceeded to the final step and found that he could perform jobs such as cleaner, laundry worker, and linen room attendant.

Arguments

Devante D. K. argued that the administrative law judge improperly discounted opinions from treating psychiatrist Dr. Lusha Liu, treating psychiatrist Dr. Reba Peoples, and therapist LaReesha Hooper. Those opinions included substantial restrictions such as the need for unscheduled breaks and more than three absences per month. Devante D. K. also challenged the administrative law judge’s reliance on state agency psychological consultants and consultative evaluator Dr. Alford Karayusuf, who had not reviewed all later medical records.

The Commissioner argued that the administrative law judge properly evaluated the opinion evidence and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Court’s analysis

Judge Thorson concluded that the administrative law judge gave adequate reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Liu’s opinion. The court found that the opinion was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with evidence showing that Devante D. K. could concentrate, maintain attention, perform daily activities, and function safely when taking his medication. The court also relied on evidence that his symptoms worsened when he did not follow his medication plan.

The court likewise upheld the weight assigned to Dr. Peoples’s opinion. Judge Thorson found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the record did not establish the severity of the proposed limitations. The court noted treatment records showing improvement in mood, energy, anxiety, concentration, insight, and judgment when Devante D. K. took his medication. The court also agreed that Dr. Peoples did not adequately explain the proposed restrictions involving breaks and absences.

Judge Thorson upheld the administrative law judge’s treatment of Ms. Hooper’s opinion because it was internally inconsistent. The court noted the tension between Hooper’s description of Devante D. K.’s prognosis as moderate to good with support and services and her opinions that he had marked or extreme limitations, needed unscheduled breaks, and would miss more than three workdays per month.

The court also rejected the argument that the administrative law judge improperly relied on the state agency consultants and Dr. Karayusuf because they did not review later records. Judge Thorson concluded that the administrative law judge independently reviewed the full record, considered later evidence, and added limitations beyond those identified by the consultants and Dr. Karayusuf.

Disposition

Judge Thorson concluded that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s residual-functional-capacity finding and the finding that Devante D. K. was not disabled under the Social Security Act. The court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.