Northland Baptist Church of St. Paul, Minnesota v. Walz

Background

The plaintiffs were two churches, a pastor, an indoor recreation facility, a small retail business, a hair salon, and the owners of those businesses. They challenged Minnesota executive orders issued during the COVID-19 pandemic, primarily Executive Order 20-74. That order allowed houses of worship and barbershops and cosmetology salons to operate at up to 50 percent of building capacity, subject to a 250-person maximum. Other public accommodations faced a 25-percent capacity limit and a 250-person maximum, while businesses classified as “Non-Critical” had to follow sanitation and social-distancing requirements.

The faith-based plaintiffs asserted claims involving religious exercise, speech, and assembly under the First Amendment and Minnesota Constitution. The business plaintiffs asserted a property-rights claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The plaintiffs also asserted an equal-protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants included Governor Tim Walz, sued personally and in his official capacity, and Attorney General Keith Ellison, sued in his official capacity.

Standing

The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of standing. It held that the faith-based plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were fairly traceable to the defendants because the executive orders gave the Attorney General enforcement authority and Minnesota law gave Governor Walz authority to direct the Attorney General to prosecute cases. The court also held that the requested relief could redress the alleged injuries because the plaintiffs sought permission to operate under the same conditions as businesses classified as “Critical,” along with monetary relief for alleged economic losses.

Immunity

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The defendants were immune in their official capacities from claims seeking retroactive or monetary relief. But at this stage, the Ex parte Young exception allowed claims for prospective or injunctive relief against Walz and Ellison in their official capacities because both officials had a sufficient connection to enforcement of the executive orders, and Ellison had enforced them at least once.

The court also held that the Pennhurst doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the officials in federal court. Those state-law claims were dismissed. Separately, the court granted the motion based on qualified immunity as to Governor Walz in his individual capacity. It concluded that existing precedent did not clearly establish that the executive orders violated the plaintiffs’ asserted constitutional rights under the circumstances of a novel global pandemic. The court therefore dismissed claims for money damages against Walz personally.

Abstention

The court denied the defendants’ request to abstain from deciding the federal claims. Pullman abstention, which allows a federal court to pause a case when an unclear state-law issue might avoid a constitutional decision, was improper because the defendants did not identify the relevant Minnesota statutes or show that an ambiguous statute could resolve the federal questions.

Colorado River abstention, which permits a federal court to refrain from proceeding in exceptional circumstances when parallel state and federal cases exist, was also improper. The state proceedings involved different parties and different forms of relief, so it was uncertain that they would fully resolve the federal claims.

Failure to State a Claim

The court held that the constitutional claims should be evaluated under traditional levels of constitutional review rather than the more deferential framework from Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s later treatment of COVID-19 restrictions in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo.

Final Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to the state-law claims, federal claims seeking damages or retrospective relief, the speech claim in Count Two, and Counts Three and Four. It denied the motion as to Count One and the federal freedom-of-assembly claim in Count Two. The order did not state that any dismissal was with or without prejudice.