Nordby v. Sherburne County

Background

Jillian Nordby alleged that Sherburne County violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) by discriminating against her because of her stutter, failing to provide a reasonable accommodation, and retaliating against her protected activity. Sherburne County moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial or whether one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Nordby’s stutter substantially affected her ability to speak and communicate. She interviewed for and obtained an Eligibility Specialist position with Sherburne County in 2018. The job involved in-person and telephone interviews, managing case files, and handling many calls. Nordby contended that she told the County during the hiring process that her stutter made communication take longer and that she expected it would take about a year to reach a full caseload. The County disputed that she made those statements.

During her probationary period, Nordby struggled with the speed and accuracy of her work, and the County gave her additional monitoring and assistance. She complained to Human Resources that her supervisor did not understand her disability and was treating the extra time caused by her stutter as a performance problem. After discussions with Human Resources and her speech pathologist, Nordby requested additional time to complete her work, which the County understood as a request for a reduced caseload. The County temporarily reduced her caseload and provided other measures, but it concluded that a significant amount of extra time or a permanent caseload reduction was not a reasonable accommodation. Sherburne County terminated Nordby on April 2, 2019, stating that her work performance did not meet expectations. Nordby contended that the actual reasons were her stutter and her accommodation requests.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Nordby presented enough evidence to create a genuine dispute about whether her stutter was a disability under the ADA and MHRA. Speaking and communicating are major life activities, and Nordby provided testimony and medical documentation describing her stutter as severe, lifelong, and greatly affecting her communication. The court noted that a factfinder could ultimately reach the opposite conclusion, but the evidence had to be viewed in Nordby’s favor at the summary-judgment stage.

The court also found a factual dispute about whether Nordby was a qualified individual—someone who could perform the job’s essential functions with or without a reasonable accommodation. Sherburne County argued that carrying a full caseload was an essential job function. The court declined to decide that issue as a matter of law because the written job description did not identify a full caseload as an essential function and new hires were routinely expected to build their caseloads gradually during the first year. The parties also disputed whether Nordby sought a permanent or temporary reduction.

Assuming that Nordby sought a temporary reduction, the court found enough evidence for a factfinder to conclude that it was a possible reasonable accommodation. The County had actually reduced her caseload for a time, and new employees ordinarily did not carry full caseloads during their probationary periods. The court further noted evidence that Nordby’s disability required extra time, that she began with a larger-than-average caseload, and that a temporary reduction might have allowed her time to become able to handle a full caseload.

For the discrimination claims, Sherburne County maintained that it terminated Nordby for poor performance. The court found sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that this explanation was a pretext, meaning a cover for unlawful discrimination. The court pointed to the timing of the termination, an email referring to how long it would take before action was taken after receiving accommodation recommendations, and disputed evidence about comments concerning Nordby’s stutter.

The court reached a similar conclusion on retaliation. A good-faith request for a reasonable accommodation and an internal report of alleged discrimination can be protected activity. The court found sufficient evidence of a possible causal connection between Nordby’s reports and accommodation requests and her termination, including the timing of those events and the email discussing further action. The court emphasized that a factfinder could still reject Nordby’s retaliation claim.

The court did not decide whether Sherburne County engaged in discrimination or retaliation, and it did not decide whether the County participated in the accommodation process in good faith. Because the existing factual disputes prevented judgment as a matter of law, Judge Donovan W. Frank denied the County’s motion for summary judgment.

Disposition

The court ordered that Defendant Sherburne County’s motion for summary judgment was DENIED.