Smith v. City of Moorhead

Background

Manuel Smith, III, proceeding without a lawyer, filed claims against Clay County, the City of Moorhead, and other named defendants. He asserted two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing lawsuits for certain violations of constitutional rights by state or local officials. Count I alleged that the County violated the Fourteenth Amendment during an investigation into whether Smith failed to report employment income. Count III alleged that the City and named individuals violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in connection with traffic stops. Smith also asserted state-law claims for malicious prosecution and attorney malpractice.

The complaint described a County prosecution related to public assistance and several traffic stops by City police between 2012 and 2020. Smith alleged that some stops resulted from racial profiling or retaliation for filing a complaint. He also alleged that the City’s mayor failed to supervise and discipline police officers. Smith applied to proceed without prepaying filing fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

A magistrate judge recommended dismissing the action without prejudice and denying the fee-waiver application as moot. Smith objected. The district court reviewed the portions of the recommendation to which he objected.

Analysis

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court must dismiss a case filed without prepayment of fees if the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. A frivolous claim has no arguable legal or factual basis. A claim fails to state a claim when the complaint does not provide enough factual content for the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable.

The court found that the complaint named Barbara Achilles, Jim Backlund, Jim Haney, Adam Krabbenhoft, and the County Board of Commissioners but alleged no legal or factual basis against them. The court therefore dismissed the action without prejudice as to those defendants.

For Count I, the court concluded that Smith had alleged only that the County violated the Fourteenth Amendment during the investigation. Because the complaint provided no additional facts supporting an inference that the County deprived Smith of a constitutional right, the court dismissed Count I without prejudice. The court also dismissed Count I without prejudice to the extent the complaint could be read to assert an official-capacity claim against Chief County Attorney Brian Melton.

For Count III, the court analyzed claims against the City and against Johnson, Judd, Monroe, and Secord in both their official and individual capacities. Official-capacity claims against these individuals were treated as claims against the City. The court held that the complaint’s bare allegations did not support an inference that a City policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise caused a constitutional violation. It therefore denied Count III without prejudice as to the City and the individuals in their official capacities.

The court also found that the individual-capacity allegations were insufficient. As to Johnson and Secord, Smith’s conclusory allegations that the officers lacked probable cause did not state a plausible claim, and the court noted that traffic stops may also be based on reasonable suspicion. As to Judd, the complaint did not indicate that he participated in the stops, and Smith’s conversation with him did not show a constitutional violation. The complaint said nothing sufficient about Monroe. The court therefore dismissed Count III without prejudice as to Johnson, Judd, Monroe, and Secord in their individual capacities.

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over Counts II and IV. It dismissed the malicious-prosecution and attorney-malpractice claims without prejudice.

Disposition

The court overruled Smith’s objection and adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation as modified. Judge John R. Tunheim ordered that the action be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend. The court denied Smith’s district-court application to proceed without prepaying fees as moot. It denied Smith’s application to proceed without prepaying fees on appeal without prejudice because the application was premature and was not signed or dated. The court clarified that dismissal without prejudice allowed Smith to reassert his claims later, if he could plead sufficient supporting facts.