Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Background

Stella Thomas originally sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., alleging sex- and race-based employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as unequal pay under the Equal Pay Act. After her employment ended, the parties sought permission to add a retaliation claim, but Thomas did not file that amended complaint by the deadline.

The parties later reached a settlement on the record, signed settlement documents, and filed a dismissal with prejudice. Thomas then sought relief from that dismissal, stating that her former lawyers lacked authority to stipulate to dismissal. District Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted that request, reopened the case, and allowed Thomas’s lawyers to withdraw. Thomas then represented herself without a lawyer.

Thomas separately filed another lawsuit against Wells Fargo involving overlapping discrimination allegations and additional allegations concerning her termination, a promotion, and overtime pay. Judge Tostrud later ordered the cases consolidated and directed Thomas to file one amended complaint. Thomas filed the operative Amended Complaint on February 4, 2021.

Wells Fargo’s Motion for Sanctions

Wells Fargo argued that Thomas improperly refused during her January 15, 2021, deposition to answer questions relating to the second lawsuit because the consolidation motions were still pending. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30, a deponent generally must answer questions after stating an objection. A deponent may be instructed not to answer only to protect a privilege, enforce a court-ordered limit, or present a proper motion to stop or limit the deposition.

The court found that Thomas impeded the deposition. It ordered that Wells Fargo may depose her again and required Thomas to pay Wells Fargo $75 under Rule 30(d)(2), which allows monetary sanctions when a person impedes, delays, or frustrates a fair deposition. The court denied Wells Fargo’s request for fees and costs under Rule 37 because the motion was treated as a sanctions motion rather than a motion to compel under that rule.

The court also denied Wells Fargo’s request to dismiss the allegations originally pleaded in the second lawsuit. It explained that dismissal as a sanction is an extreme remedy generally requiring willful disobedience of a court order or continued failure to prosecute. The court did not find dismissal appropriate at that time, while warning that future violations of the order, other court orders, or applicable rules could lead to further sanctions, including possible dismissal.

Thomas’s Rule 11 Motion

Thomas asked the court to strike Wells Fargo’s sanctions motion and sanction Wells Fargo and its lawyers under Rule 11. The court denied the motion. It found that Thomas did not comply with Rule 11’s 21-day safe-harbor requirement, which requires the person seeking sanctions to serve the motion and allow time for withdrawal or correction before filing it with the court.

The court further held that the motion would fail even if the notice requirement had been satisfied. It found that Wells Fargo’s sanctions motion had a legal basis and that its factual statements had evidentiary support. The court concluded that Thomas’s conduct during the deposition violated Rule 30 and therefore did not show that Wells Fargo’s motion was sanctionable under Rule 11.

Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order

Wells Fargo requested an extension of the deadline for dispositive motions until 30 days after Thomas’s rescheduled deposition. Thomas argued that the existing schedule should not govern the consolidated case and requested a new schedule allowing more time for discovery.

The court partly granted and partly denied Wells Fargo’s motion. It found good cause to modify the existing schedule because the Amended Complaint had been filed, but also concluded that additional deadlines should be adjusted. The court ordered that fact discovery and non-dispositive motions be completed or filed within 60 days of the order, with the remaining deadlines reset accordingly. It directed that a Third Amended Pretrial Scheduling Order be issued.

The court stated that Thomas could conduct additional discovery concerning the claims in the Amended Complaint, but would not be allowed to completely re-litigate the original claims. It reasoned that Wells Fargo had already produced substantial employment and termination-related documents and that a lengthy discovery period was unnecessary.

Disposition

The opinion addressed deposition conduct, sanctions, and case scheduling. It did not decide the merits of Thomas’s employment-related claims.