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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled July 1, 2021

Pollock, Jr. v. Kallis

Judge
David Doty
Docket
0:20-cv-00359
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
8
HabeasCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Pollock, Jr. v. Kallis, Judge Doty denied Pollock’s petition and motion, ruling his custody-classification challenges could not proceed through this type of federal custody case.

Who this affects

Charles W. Pollock, Jr., whose custody-classification challenges were denied; and Warden S. Kallis, Jill Slegh, and Jeremy Nerdstadt, who were the named respondents.

What happened

In Pollock, Jr. v. Kallis, Charles W. Pollock, Jr. challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ decision to classify him at the highest custody level. He argued that the classification limited his ability to earn additional good-time credits and transfer to another prison camp, violating his rights.

The court agreed with the magistrate judge that these claims could not proceed through Pollock’s federal custody petition. Pollock remained eligible for good-time credits, and his classification challenge concerned prison conditions rather than the execution of his sentence. The court also ruled that federal law blocked review of the Bureau’s classification decision under the Administrative Procedure Act.

Judge David S. Doty overruled Pollock’s objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation in full, denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and denied the motion to adjudicate.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Pollock, Jr. v. Kallis · No. 0:20-cv-00359
Judge
David Doty
Date
July 1, 2021

Background

Charles W. Pollock, Jr. petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal procedure for challenging certain aspects of a person’s custody or sentence. Pollock challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ custody classification, which assigned him a score of seven and a highest-severity public-safety classification. The classification affected his ability to earn additional good-time credits through programming and his ability to transfer to another prison camp.

The Bureau relied on Pollock’s federal conviction, the sentencing court’s findings about his offense conduct, and information in his presentence investigation report. Pollock had been convicted of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition and attempting to tamper with a witness by corrupt persuasion. The Bureau determined that the offense conduct described in the presentence report involved threatening and sexually assaulting a woman and was comparable to the Bureau’s highest-severity kidnapping and sexual-offense categories.

A magistrate judge recommended denying Pollock’s petition and his motion to adjudicate. The recommendation concluded that Pollock had not raised a claim cognizable under § 2241 and that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his due-process challenge. Pollock objected.

Court’s Analysis

The court reviewed the challenged portions of the recommendation independently and agreed with the magistrate judge.

First, the court rejected Pollock’s claim that his classification prevented him from earning good-time credits. The court explained that Pollock remained eligible to receive good-time credits, although his classification prevented him from earning additional credits through the relevant programming. Because the classification did not categorically prevent him from accumulating good-time credit, the court held that this claim did not create a claim under § 2241.

Second, the court rejected Pollock’s challenge to his inability to transfer to another prison camp. The Bureau could waive the public-safety classification. The court further concluded that, even without a waiver provision, this challenge concerned a condition of confinement and therefore had to be brought in a civil lawsuit rather than through a § 2241 custody petition. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Pollock’s habeas petition.

The court also addressed Pollock’s due-process theory as an Administrative Procedure Act claim. The Administrative Procedure Act generally permits judicial review of agency action unless review is legally barred. The court held that the Bureau’s classification decision was made under 18 U.S.C. § 3621, and 18 U.S.C. § 3625 precluded judicial review of that type of decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court therefore concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.

The court also noted that any attempt to challenge Pollock’s sentence or the facts supporting it had to be made through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not through a § 2241 petition.

Disposition

Judge David S. Doty overruled Pollock’s objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in its entirety, denied Pollock’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and denied Pollock’s motion to adjudicate.

The authoritative version

Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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