Jacobson v. County of Chisago

Background

Michelle Jacobson worked as an Office Support Specialist for the Chisago County Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff Richard Duncan was her highest-ranking supervisor. Beginning in October 2017, Duncan created letters and messages under the name “Control Freak,” pretending to be an anonymous person threatening Jacobson and her family and pressuring Jacobson and Duncan to have an affair. Duncan showed Jacobson at least one letter while wearing his badge and uniform, discouraged her from filing a police report, and claimed to offer protection. Duncan later admitted creating the scheme and testified that he wanted to manufacture a crisis that he could solve.

Jacobson reported the conduct to her immediate supervisor in November 2017 but initially asked that it not be reported to the county’s human-resources department. She testified that she feared retaliation and threats against her children. She filed a human-resources complaint in March 2018. The county hired an outside investigator, whose report concluded that Duncan had sexually harassed Jacobson. Duncan retired effective May 4, 2018. Jacobson alleged that the scheme caused severe emotional distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder, physical symptoms, counseling, and her family’s relocation to another county.

Claims and motions

Jacobson sued Duncan and Chisago County. Her claims were:

- sexual harassment against Chisago under the Minnesota Human Rights Act; - deprivation of equal-protection rights against Duncan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against people who violate federal rights while acting under state authority; - intentional infliction of emotional distress against Duncan; and - vicarious liability against Chisago for Duncan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Jacobson moved for partial summary judgment on liability. Chisago moved for summary judgment on the claims against the county. Duncan opposed Jacobson’s motion as to the § 1983 and emotional-distress claims.

Minnesota Human Rights Act claim

The court ruled that Duncan was Jacobson’s supervisor under the Minnesota Human Rights Act because he had authority over her daily work and his employment recommendations carried substantial weight. The court therefore applied the legal framework for harassment by a supervisor rather than the framework for harassment by an outside third party.

Under that framework, an employer may avoid liability in some cases by proving that it reasonably prevented and corrected harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to use available procedures. The court held that Chisago could not establish the second part of that defense. Jacobson reported the conduct to her immediate supervisor, and the court found that her delay in reporting it to human resources was not unreasonable in light of Duncan’s threats and her fear of retaliation. The court did not decide whether Minnesota law recognizes a separate “proxy” theory or whether Jacobson was constructively discharged.

The court therefore granted Jacobson’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Minnesota Human Rights Act claim against Chisago and denied Chisago’s cross-motion on that claim.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Minnesota law requires proof that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, intentional or reckless, caused emotional distress, and caused severe distress. The court held that Duncan’s “Control Freak” scheme was extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. It also found that the record established severe distress, citing Jacobson’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, counseling, physical symptoms, and relocation of her family. The court granted Jacobson summary judgment on her intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Duncan.

The court reached a different result for Chisago. Applying Minnesota’s municipal tort-immunity law, it held that the county was immune from vicarious liability because Duncan acted for his own personal purposes and not in performing duties or tasks lawfully assigned to the county sheriff. The court therefore granted Chisago’s motion on this claim and denied Jacobson’s motion as to the county.

Section 1983 claim

The court held that Duncan acted under color of state law, meaning that a sufficient connection existed between his official position and the harmful conduct. Duncan wore his badge and uniform, used his office and authority, selected Jacobson because of his control over her work environment, and claimed to use official resources and police protection as part of the scheme. The court also considered Duncan’s conviction for misconduct of a public officer.

The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Duncan was not acting under color of law. It granted Jacobson’s motion for partial summary judgment on her § 1983 claim against Duncan.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Jacobson’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. It granted the motion on Jacobson’s Minnesota Human Rights Act claim against Chisago and on her intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and § 1983 claims against Duncan. It denied the motion on Jacobson’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Chisago.

The court granted in part and denied in part Chisago’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. It granted the motion on Jacobson’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Chisago and denied it on Jacobson’s Minnesota Human Rights Act claim. The court ordered the parties to schedule a final settlement conference and stated that the case would go to trial on January 18, 2022.