LeBlanc v. Wilkie
- Susan Nelson
- 0:19-cv-02401
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 29
In LeBlanc v. McDonough, Judge Nelson granted the VA Secretary’s summary-judgment motion and denied LeBlanc’s partial-summary-judgment motion on his Rehabilitation Act claims.
Jesse LeBlanc’s Rehabilitation Act claims against the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs were resolved against LeBlanc. The Secretary obtained summary judgment on the remaining claims, and LeBlanc’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied.
What happened
In LeBlanc v. McDonough, Jesse LeBlanc, a VA police officer with vestibular dysfunction, requested a stable schedule with limited night shifts and other changes. The VA temporarily assigned him to day shifts, then reassigned him to a transportation-assistant position after determining that his requested schedule would conflict with a collective-bargaining agreement. LeBlanc later was not selected for a VA training-instructor position.
LeBlanc claimed that the VA failed to accommodate his disability, discriminated against him because of his disability when it did not select him for the training-instructor position, and retaliated against him for requesting an accommodation. He argued that the reassignment was not a reasonable accommodation and that the VA’s stated reasons for not selecting him were a cover for discrimination and retaliation.
The court rejected those arguments, concluding that the reassignment was a reasonable accommodation, that the requested schedule would create an undue hardship, and that LeBlanc had not shown disability discrimination or retaliation. Judge Nelson granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment and denied LeBlanc’s motion for partial summary judgment.
The detailed version
- LeBlanc v. Wilkie · No. 0:19-cv-02401
- Susan Nelson
- July 22, 2021
Background
Jesse LeBlanc worked as a police officer for the Department of Veterans Affairs Police Department at the St. Cloud VA Medical Center from 2012 through 2018. He was diagnosed with vestibular dysfunction and experienced dizziness and other symptoms. His regular schedule rotated between 12-hour day and night shifts.
In February 2018, LeBlanc requested workplace accommodations, including a stable schedule, limited night shifts, fewer short-notice schedule changes, limited overtime and weekend shifts, short-notice sick leave, fewer distractions, and the ability to move rather than remain at one workstation. Medical records provided to the VA stated that a regular daytime schedule could improve his symptoms.
The VA temporarily placed LeBlanc on day shifts for a trial period. He reported that his symptoms improved and said that not working night shifts had been successful. The police chief reported that the temporary arrangement created staffing difficulties, including the need for other officers to cover LeBlanc’s night shifts, overtime payments, and the use of a non-patrol employee for coverage.
The VA and the American Federation of Government Employees were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement requiring off-shifts, including night shifts, to be rotated fairly and equitably among affected employees. VA counsel advised that giving LeBlanc only day shifts would violate that agreement and create an undue hardship. The VA therefore denied his requested accommodation and offered reassignment to another position. LeBlanc accepted the reassignment and became a transportation assistant.
Around the same time, LeBlanc applied for detective and training-instructor positions within the police department. He was not selected for either position, but the claims concerning the detective position and his removal from his police-officer position were later withdrawn. The remaining claims concerned accommodation, selection for the training-instructor position, and retaliation.
Claims and arguments
Count 1 alleged that the VA failed to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. LeBlanc argued that reassignment was an adverse employment action and was not reasonable because reassignment is an accommodation of last resort. He also argued that the VA failed to continue the interactive process and should have considered other accommodations that would have allowed him to remain a police officer.
Count 4 alleged disability discrimination based on the VA’s failure to select LeBlanc for the training-instructor position. The VA stated that LeBlanc was not the best candidate based on the evidence, references, application materials, and results from a second round of interviews. LeBlanc argued that concerns about an alleged statement that he would flee an active-shooter situation, and the second-round interview scores, were pretexts for disability discrimination. LeBlanc denied making the alleged statement.
Count 5 alleged retaliation for requesting a reasonable accommodation. LeBlanc relied primarily on the timing between his accommodation request and his non-selection. The VA argued that timing alone did not establish causation and that the alleged statement, references, and second interviews were intervening events explaining the hiring decision.
Court’s analysis
The court applied the summary-judgment standard, under which judgment is entered when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.
For the accommodation claim, the court held that LeBlanc did not make the required initial showing of an adverse employment action. The court concluded that reassignment was a reasonable accommodation tailored to his request for a stable daytime schedule. Although reassignment is an accommodation of last resort, the court stated that it remains a recognized accommodation and that an employee is not entitled to the accommodation of his choice.
The court further held that, even if LeBlanc had made the required initial showing, the VA demonstrated undue hardship. The court reasoned that the requested reduction in night shifts would conflict with the collective-bargaining agreement’s requirement that off-shifts be fairly and equitably rotated and would require other employees to cover additional night shifts. The court also found that the VA sufficiently engaged in the required interactive process through its discussions with LeBlanc, temporary day-shift arrangement, review of medical records, meetings, and reconsideration process. Finally, the court found that LeBlanc had not shown that a comparable position within the police department was available, so he did not establish that the reassignment was unreasonable.
For the disability-discrimination claim, the parties agreed that LeBlanc had established an initial case and that the VA had offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting him. The court held that LeBlanc did not provide enough evidence to show that the VA’s stated reason was false and that disability discrimination was the real reason. The court emphasized that it was not deciding whether the hiring decision was wise or fair, but whether the evidence showed intentional discrimination.
For the retaliation claim, the court held that LeBlanc did not show the required causal connection between his accommodation request and his non-selection. The court stated that timing alone was insufficient and identified the alleged active-shooter statement, the references, and the second round of interviews as intervening events. The court also held that LeBlanc presented no evidence that retaliation was the reason for the hiring decision.
Disposition
Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted the Secretary’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied LeBlanc’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly. The opinion’s caption names Denis McDonough as the defendant because he had been automatically substituted for former Secretary Robert Wilkie.
Read the full 29-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.