Myrna E. D. v. Kijakazi
- Becky Thorson
- 0:20-cv-00887
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 18
In Myrna E. D. v. Saul, Magistrate Judge Thorson remanded the disability-benefits case after finding inadequate reasons for rejecting a treating doctor’s opinion.
Myrna E. D. and the Social Security Administration. The decision requires further administrative review of the treating physician’s opinions, the residual functional capacity, and the work findings; it does not itself award benefits.
What happened
Myrna E. D. asked the federal court to review the denial of her application for Social Security disability insurance benefits. The Administrative Law Judge found that she could not return to her past work but could perform other jobs, so the judge found her not disabled.
Myrna E. D. argued that the Administrative Law Judge underestimated her limits on standing, walking, and using her hands, improperly discounted medical opinions, and handled her reports of symptoms incorrectly. The court agreed that the reasons given for discounting treating physician Joann Neubauer’s opinion were inadequate, but found substantial evidence supporting the mental-work limits in the decision.
Judge Becky R. Thorson granted Myrna E. D.’s summary-judgment motion in part, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge must reconsider Neubauer’s opinions, Myrna E. D.’s residual functional capacity, and the later steps involving past and other work; the court did not rule on the earlier credibility findings.
The detailed version
- Myrna E. D. v. Kijakazi · No. 0:20-cv-00887
- Becky Thorson
- Sept. 7, 2021
Background
Myrna E. D. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. She had an above-the-knee amputation of her left leg and used a prosthesis. The opinion describes complaints and treatment involving back and leg pain, scoliosis, problems with the prosthesis, and upper-extremity symptoms.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Myrna E. D. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 31, 2016, and had several severe impairments, including major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, degenerative disc disease with scoliosis, the left-leg amputation with prosthesis, fibromyalgia, upper-extremity overuse syndrome, arthritis, and right-hand carpal tunnel syndrome. The Administrative Law Judge found that she could perform light work with physical, mental, and social limitations. Because she could not perform her past work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the Administrative Law Judge found her not disabled. The Appeals Council declined review, making that decision the Commissioner’s final decision.
Issues and analysis
Myrna E. D. raised three issues: whether the residual functional capacity—meaning the most work she could perform despite her limitations—failed to account for significant limits on standing, walking, and hand use; whether the Administrative Law Judge improperly discounted medical opinions; and whether the Administrative Law Judge improperly evaluated her reported symptoms.
The court focused primarily on the opinion of treating physician Joann Neubauer. Neubauer stated that Myrna E. D. could not persistently stand, reach, push, or pull and had difficulty with repetitive fine-motor grasping. The Administrative Law Judge gave the opinion some weight but called the limitations vague and stated generally that Neubauer’s treatment records did not objectively support greater limitations than those included in the residual functional capacity.
The court held that these were not adequate reasons for discounting Neubauer’s opinion. It emphasized Neubauer’s several years of treatment and many visits, as well as records documenting continuing pain, scoliosis related at least in part to the poorly fitting prosthesis, and hand conditions. The court concluded that the residual-functional-capacity finding was not supported by substantial evidence as it stood because the Administrative Law Judge did not properly analyze Neubauer’s opinion under the standards for treating-source opinions or explain the alleged inconsistencies in sufficient detail.
The court rejected Myrna E. D.’s challenge to the treatment of psychologist Patrick Carroll’s opinions about her mental limitations. It found substantial evidence supporting the mental restrictions limiting her to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and occasional, superficial interaction with others. The court also declined to rule at that time on the challenge to the Administrative Law Judge’s evaluation of her reported symptoms because the residual-functional-capacity analysis would have to be reconsidered on remand.
Disposition
Judge Becky R. Thorson ordered that:
- Myrna E. D.’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part. - The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment was denied. - The matter was remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On remand, the Administrative Law Judge must evaluate Neubauer’s opinions about Myrna E. D.’s physical limitations consistently with the court’s order, reconsider the residual functional capacity, and reconsider steps four and five of the disability analysis. The order did not award benefits or determine that Myrna E. D. was disabled.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.