Larson v. City of Minneapolis

Background

Autumn Larson sued the City of Minneapolis and unidentified officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and Minnesota’s Municipal Tort Claims Act. She alleged that an unidentified officer fired a projectile into her face while she was trying to leave Minneapolis after peacefully protesting George Floyd’s murder. She sought damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, but not an injunction or declaration.

The complaint asserted several claims. The curfew-related claims alleged that Mayor Jacob Frey’s citywide nighttime curfew violated Larson’s First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly and her Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of movement and public presence. Count 5 asserted the Fourteenth Amendment theory, and Count 6 asserted the First Amendment theory. Count 4 alleged that the City was liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services for constitutional violations, including those alleged in Counts 5 and 6. The complaint also included excessive-force claims and state-law battery and negligence claims.

Standing and jurisdiction

The City moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court first considered whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning authority to decide the dispute. The court rejected the City’s argument that Larson’s facial challenge was moot merely because the temporary curfew had expired. The court concluded that Larson was not bringing an overbreadth challenge and that the curfew’s expiration therefore did not eliminate jurisdiction on that basis.

The court identified a separate standing problem. Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show, among other things, that the injury is traceable to the challenged conduct and that a favorable decision could redress the injury. Larson challenged only Mayor Frey’s curfew, but Governor Tim Walz had issued a separate, overlapping curfew order. Larson’s complaint acknowledged that if either order was lawful, her nighttime presence could be punished. Because Larson did not challenge Governor Walz’s order, a ruling against Mayor Frey’s order would not have allowed Larson to engage in the same nighttime activities. The court therefore concluded that Larson had not established at least redressability and that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the curfew-related aspects of her claims.

The court distinguished those claims from Larson’s excessive-force allegations. It stated that Larson had standing concerning the alleged use of force, but had not plausibly connected the officers’ actions to Mayor Frey’s curfew. Larson was not detained or charged for violating the curfew, and the complaint did not allege facts showing that the officers’ order for her to leave the highway ramp was related to the curfew.

Alternative merits analysis

Although the lack of jurisdiction ordinarily would prevent a court from reaching the merits, the court considered the merits in the alternative because the parties had not briefed the jurisdictional issue. Regarding the First Amendment claim, the court treated Larson’s challenge as a facial challenge to a content-neutral restriction. Under the ordinary standard discussed by the court, such a restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and must leave ample alternative channels for communication.

The court concluded that public safety was a significant governmental interest because the curfew responded to fires, looting, property destruction, and widespread civil unrest. It found that Larson had not plausibly alleged that the curfew was substantially broader than necessary. Her proposed alternative of imposing a curfew only in areas experiencing unrest was, in the court’s view, insufficiently defined and unsupported by the complaint. The court also concluded that the curfew left alternative channels for expression because people could protest during the fourteen hours each day when the curfew did not apply, and could use other locations or online communications.

The court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment freedom-of-movement and public-presence claim failed for the same reasons. It applied the same general type of analysis and noted that Larson identified no meaningful difference between that claim and her First Amendment claim. The court also stated that dismissal would remain appropriate even under stricter scrutiny because the public-safety interest was compelling and the curfew was proportional to that interest.

Disposition

The court ordered that the City’s motion to dismiss was GRANTED. It ordered that Counts 5 and 6 were DISMISSED without prejudice. It also ordered that Count 4 was DISMISSED without prejudice to the extent it was derived from Counts 5 and 6.