Todd v. American Federation of State
- Susan Nelson
- 0:21-cv-00637
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 23
In Todd v. AFSCME Council 5, Judge Nelson granted the Union’s motion to dismiss, ending federal claims with prejudice and state claims without prejudice.
Marcus Todd’s federal claims were dismissed with prejudice, while his state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice. The Union obtained dismissal of the claims challenged in its motion, and the court found that Todd’s future-dues claims were moot because deductions had stopped.
What happened
Marcus Todd sued American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 5, over union-dues deductions from his paychecks. He alleged that the Union deducted dues before and after the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Janus, used a membership agreement with a forged signature, continued deductions after he resigned, and unlawfully limited when he could opt out.
The Union argued that Janus did not protect employees who voluntarily joined a union, that the alleged forgery was private conduct rather than government action required for a civil-rights claim, and that Todd’s requests to stop future deductions were moot because deductions had ended. It also asked the court to dismiss Todd’s state-law claims if the federal claims were dismissed.
Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted the Union’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Counts 1 through 4 with prejudice, including Todd’s federal claims about the dues deductions and opt-out period, and dismissed Counts 5 through 9 without prejudice because it declined to keep the related state-law claims.
The detailed version
- Todd v. American Federation of State · No. 0:21-cv-00637
- Susan Nelson
- Nov. 10, 2021
Background
Marcus Todd alleged that he worked as a security counselor for the Minnesota Department of Human Services in St. Peter, Minnesota. When he began working there in 2014, he joined American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 5 (the Union), and authorized dues deductions from his paychecks. He alleged that the Union or one of its agents forged his signature on a new membership agreement in June 2018. He further alleged that the Union deducted dues under that agreement, continued doing so after he resigned in July 2020, and refused to stop the deductions until the agreement’s annual opt-out period. The Union denied that forgery occurred.
Todd sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that allows claims for constitutional violations by someone acting under state authority. His federal claims covered dues deducted before the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, dues deducted after Janus and before his resignation, dues deducted after his resignation, and the Union’s 15-day annual opt-out window. He also brought state-law claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, civil theft, interference with contractual relations, and unlawful wage deductions.
The Union’s Motion
The Union moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. It argued that Janus applied to nonmembers who were charged fair-share fees, not employees who joined a union and agreed to pay membership dues. It also argued that the alleged forgery and related dues deductions were private conduct, not action under state law required for a § 1983 claim. Finally, it argued that Todd’s requests for declarations and an order stopping future deductions were moot because deductions had stopped, and that the court should dismiss the state-law claims if all federal claims were dismissed.
**Count 1: Pre-Janus Dues**
The court held that Janus did not provide relief for Todd’s claim concerning dues deducted before June 27, 2018. The court explained that Janus addressed the First Amendment rights of nonunion members who were required to pay fair-share fees, not people who chose to join a union and receive membership benefits. Todd did not challenge whether he signed the 2014 membership agreement, and the court found that his allegation that he disliked the available choices did not plausibly show that he was compelled to join.
The court also held that the Union had a good-faith defense for the pre-Janus deductions. Before Janus, Minnesota law allowed the arrangement, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education supported its constitutionality. The court found no plausible allegation that the Union acted maliciously, knew the law was unconstitutional, or otherwise acted in bad faith. The court granted the motion as to Count 1 and dismissed Count 1 with prejudice.
**Counts 2 and 3: Post-Janus Dues and Alleged Forgery**
For Counts 2 and 3, the court assumed the alleged facts for purposes of the motion, including Todd’s allegation that the Union forged his signature and continued authorizing deductions after his resignation. The court applied the two-part test from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. for deciding whether private conduct can be treated as action under state law.
First, the court held that Todd’s alleged injury came from the Union’s private conduct—allegedly forging the membership agreement and continuing to authorize deductions—not from a state policy. Minnesota’s law permitted employers to deduct union dues under a valid membership agreement, but it did not permit unions to forge signatures. Second, the court held that the Union was not a state actor because Minnesota and the Department of Human Services merely processed payroll deductions and did not participate in creating the agreement or the alleged forgery. The court granted the motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 with prejudice.
Count 4: Annual Opt-Out Window
The court rejected Todd’s claim that Janus gave him the right to end dues deductions immediately, regardless of the opt-out terms in his membership agreement. Relying on contract principles and decisions from other courts, the court held that Janus did not eliminate contractual obligations that applied under generally applicable state contract law. The court also found that the 15-day opt-out period was similar to periods other courts had upheld. The court granted the motion as to Count 4 and dismissed Count 4 with prejudice.
Prospective Relief
Todd sought declaratory and injunctive relief—court orders stating his rights or requiring future conduct. The Union submitted evidence that it had stopped authorizing deductions beginning with Todd’s May 7, 2021 paycheck and that there was no evidence he had rejoined the Union. The court found no reasonable expectation that Todd would again face the same deductions unless he chose to rejoin. It therefore held that his claims for prospective relief were moot and granted the Union’s motion on that issue.
State-Law Claims and Disposition
The court’s jurisdiction over Todd’s state-law claims was supplemental, meaning it depended on the federal claims being part of the same dispute. After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. It dismissed Counts 5 through 9 without prejudice.
The order states: (1) the Union’s motion to dismiss was granted; (2) Counts 1 through 4 were dismissed with prejudice; and (3) Counts 5 through 9 were dismissed without prejudice.
Read the full 23-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.