Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota

Background

The plaintiffs were the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, Chief of Police Sara Rice in her official capacity, and Sergeant Derrick Naumann in his official capacity. They sued the County of Mille Lacs, County Attorney Joseph Walsh, and Sheriff Donald J. Lorge, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the Band’s law-enforcement authority within the Mille Lacs Reservation.

The Band relied on Article 2 of an 1855 treaty, which it said established a reservation that had never been diminished or disestablished. Walsh and Lorge took the position that later federal treaties, statutes, and agreements had diminished or disestablished the reservation. The County had entered into a 2008 cooperative law-enforcement agreement with the Band but terminated it in 2016. Walsh then issued an opinion and protocol limiting the Band officers’ authority, and the Sheriff’s Office enforced those limits.

The parties later entered into a temporary 2018 law-enforcement agreement. That agreement gave the Band concurrent jurisdiction in specified circumstances and automatically terminated 90 days after the final resolution of the case. In December 2020, the Court had ruled that the Band had standing, that its claims were ripe, and that the case was not moot. The parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment were still pending and were to be addressed in a separate order.

The Eighth Circuit appeal

Walsh and Lorge filed an interlocutory appeal challenging issues including federal jurisdiction, whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action against them, and immunity. They did not appeal the district court’s ruling on mootness. While the appeal was pending, they asked the Eighth Circuit to dismiss the appeal on mootness grounds, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cooley.

The Eighth Circuit stated that the motion to dismiss was granted on terms fixed by the court, with each side bearing its own appellate costs. The district court construed that ruling as a voluntary dismissal of the appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b), not as a ruling that the underlying case was moot. The Eighth Circuit later summarily denied Walsh and Lorge’s motion to recall its mandate.

Mootness standard

Mootness is a jurisdictional doctrine that applies when changed circumstances eliminate a live dispute and make court action unnecessary. A defendant’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not automatically make a case moot because the defendant might resume that conduct. The party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden to show that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur.

Analysis

The Court first concluded that the Eighth Circuit had not ruled on mootness. Because Walsh and Lorge had not timely sought rehearing or reconsideration of the appellate dismissal, and because the appellate judgment did not direct the district court to dismiss the case, the district court addressed the mootness arguments itself.

The Court held that the officials’ arguments based on the 2018 agreement and the revocation of Walsh’s 2016 opinion and protocol were not properly presented as a request for reconsideration. The officials had previously raised related arguments, and they did not identify the compelling or exceptional circumstances required for reconsideration. Even if the arguments were properly before the Court, however, the Court rejected them on the merits of the mootness issue.

For purposes of the motion, the Court assumed that Walsh had revoked the 2016 opinion and protocol. Walsh stated that, after Cooley, he would not reissue that opinion and protocol if the 2018 agreement ended. Lorge stated that he would follow the County Attorney’s advice and instruct his personnel accordingly.

The Court found that these statements did not give the Band the declarations it requested or resolve the essential dispute over the reservation’s geographic boundaries. The officials continued to maintain that the reservation had been disestablished, while the Band maintained that the reservation remained as established by the 1855 treaty. The 2018 agreement was temporary and would end after final resolution of the case, so the boundary dispute would remain.

The Court also found that Cooley did not moot the case. Cooley addressed tribal police authority to temporarily detain and search a non-Indian on a public right-of-way within an Indian reservation. It did not address tribal law-enforcement authority where the reservation’s boundaries themselves were disputed. The Court therefore concluded that Cooley and Walsh’s statements did not resolve the live boundary issue.

Finally, the Court rejected the argument that finding the case was not moot would require speculation about what Walsh, Lorge, or their successors might do after the 2018 agreement ended. Given the officials’ continuing position that the reservation had been disestablished and the importance of that position to the scope of the Band’s authority, the Court found that the possibility of recurring challenged conduct was not merely speculative.

Disposition

The Court denied Walsh and Lorge’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on Mootness. The order did not decide the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment; the Court stated that those motions would be addressed separately.