Mason v. Johnston

Background

Ricky Mason is civilly committed at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota. He alleged that Nancy Johnston and other defendants violated his First Amendment freedom-of-association rights by preventing him from calling or receiving visits from Cara Keinanen, a former MSOP staff member. He also alleged that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process rights by blocking Keinanen’s phone numbers without adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge the blocks.

MSOP policies restrict personal relationships between staff and clients and presume against visits by former staff members. MSOP may also block phone numbers when calls are considered contrary to a client’s medical welfare or facility rules. Mason and Keinanen continued communicating after Keinanen left MSOP in 2016. MSOP blocked several numbers Mason used to contact her in 2017 and issued Mason a Behavior Expectations Report for continuing to try to contact her. A later block occurred in February 2019. Mason challenged that block through MSOP’s grievance process and appealed after the grievance was denied. Mason and Keinanen remained able to exchange letters.

The court had previously dismissed several claims, including claims against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, claims against one individual, damages claims against individuals in their personal capacities, substantive-due-process claims, and the procedural-due-process claim concerning the denial of Keinanen’s visitation applications. The remaining claims were the First Amendment claim concerning visits and telephone calls and the procedural-due-process claim concerning the 2017 and 2019 phone-number blocks.

Summary-judgment standard

The court explained that summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact could affect the outcome, and a genuine dispute exists when the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to decide for the nonmoving party. The court must view the evidence favorably to the nonmoving party and may not decide witness credibility or weigh competing evidence at this stage. The court also construed Mason’s filings under the more flexible standard applied to people representing themselves, while noting that self-represented litigants must still follow substantive and procedural law.

First Amendment claim

The court applied a modified version of the four-factor test from Turner v. Safley as a guide for evaluating whether MSOP’s restriction was reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests. The first factor asks whether there is a valid, rational connection between the restriction and the interest it is meant to serve. The remaining factors concern available alternatives, the effect of accommodating the right on the institution and others, and whether obvious alternatives existed.

The defendants said the restrictions were justified by security risks and the counter-therapeutic nature of Mason’s relationship with Keinanen. The court found that the defendants had not shown how calls or visits with Keinanen continued to create those risks. The court noted that calls and visits were monitored, Keinanen had not worked at MSOP for more than five years, and the defendants offered only general assertions about possible escape attempts, contraband, and other criminal activity. The court also observed that the relationship’s earlier problems were connected primarily to Keinanen’s status as an MSOP staff member, which had changed.

Because the record did not establish a rational connection between the restriction and MSOP’s stated interests, the court found that further factual development was required. The court did not need to decide the remaining factors, although it stated that those factors would not support summary judgment on the existing record. In particular, the court found a factual question about whether letters were an adequate alternative to both calls and visits, and it found that the defendants had not explained why allowing calls or visits would require additional monitoring or special procedures.

The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Mason’s First Amendment claim.

Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claim

Procedural due process generally requires notice of the factual basis for a deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest and a fair opportunity to challenge the decision. The court had previously determined that Mason had a protected liberty interest in associating with Keinanen.

For the 2017 phone-number blocks, the court found that MSOP gave Mason sufficient process. MSOP provided notifications stating brief reasons for the blocks and their duration. Mason’s therapist discussed the decision with him, and Mason received a Behavior Expectations Report and an opportunity to present his position at a hearing.

For the 2019 block, the record did not show that Mason was affirmatively notified when the block was imposed. But within a week after he discovered it, MSOP provided the reasons and factual basis for the block. Mason had an opportunity to rebut the decision and then appeal after MSOP upheld it. The court concluded that these procedures satisfied constitutional due-process requirements.

The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Mason’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claim.

Disposition

The order states:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was DENIED as to the First Amendment claim. 2. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was GRANTED as to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim.

The First Amendment claim was not resolved by this order.