Peggy C. O. v. Kijakazi

Background

Peggy C. O. sought disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. She alleged disability beginning in October 2013, based in this case on mental impairments including social anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and major depressive disorder. After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing and found that she was not disabled. The Social Security Appeals Council declined review, and Peggy C. O. brought this case challenging the ALJ’s decision.

The ALJ found that Peggy C. O. could perform work at all physical exertion levels, subject to limits on the complexity of tasks, workplace changes, interactions with coworkers and supervisors, teamwork, and contact with the public. Based on a vocational expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that she could perform representative jobs including night cleaner, rack room worker, and trimmer.

Arguments and Evidence

Peggy C. O. challenged the ALJ’s decision on summary judgment. She argued that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of David L. Kuehl, her treating psychologist. Kuehl identified significant limitations involving memory, attention, work stress, following instructions, completing a normal workday, maintaining a consistent pace, and likely absences. Peggy C. O. argued that the resulting residual functional capacity—the most work a person can do despite her limitations—did not include all of those restrictions and therefore did not support the finding that she could perform other work.

The Commissioner argued that the ALJ properly evaluated Kuehl’s opinion and that the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate. The record included evidence of anxiety, depression, panic attacks, treatment through medication and mental-health services, and a period of intensive residential treatment. It also included many treatment observations describing Peggy C. O. as alert, engaged, appropriately groomed, and having largely normal speech, thought processes, attention, concentration, and memory. The record also described activities including volunteering, using public transportation, working as a bartender during part of the relevant period, playing tennis, hunting, and performing household or family-related activities.

Court’s Analysis

The court concluded that the ALJ applied the correct regulatory framework for evaluating a treating source’s opinion. The court explained that such an opinion receives controlling weight only when it is well supported by acceptable medical techniques and is not inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ must give good reasons when assigning the opinion less weight.

The court held that the ALJ gave adequate reasons for assigning little weight to Kuehl’s opinion. First, the court agreed that Kuehl’s severe limitations were not generally consistent with his treatment notes or other mental-status examinations, which repeatedly showed normal or largely normal findings despite recurring anxiety and depression. Second, the court found that the ALJ could consider the overall course of treatment, including improvement with medication and support, the absence of psychiatric treatment during the relevant period, and the lack of symptoms lasting at the required 12-month duration in connection with the intensive residential treatment placement. Third, the court held that the ALJ could consider activities such as volunteering, using public transportation, working as a bartender, playing tennis, hunting, cooking, caring for her son, and managing finances as one factor in evaluating the extent of the limitations. Finally, the court identified an additional inconsistency: Kuehl had treated Peggy C. O. for several years but marked that he did not know whether her conditions would last at least 12 months, without explaining the answer.

Because the ALJ reasonably discounted the limitations in Kuehl’s opinion, the court also rejected Peggy C. O.’s challenge to the vocational expert’s testimony. The ALJ was required to include in the vocational hypothetical only limitations supported by the record and was not required to include limitations the ALJ reasonably found unsupported.

Disposition

Judge Tony N. Leung denied Peggy C. O.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly, leaving the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income in place.