Campbell v. Mold Inspection & Testing MI&T

Background

James Paul Campbell, representing himself, sued Mold Inspection & Testing MI&T and Adam Pacha, identified as MI&T’s chief executive officer and agent. The case was based on a mold inspection that Campbell hired MI&T to perform at the rental property where he lived. Campbell paid $400 for the inspection. He alleged that the inspection report identified mold and mold conditions, but that his later requests for follow-up work went unanswered.

Campbell also alleged that he paid MI&T $600 to secure the inspector’s presence and expert testimony at a December 2, 2020 trial. According to Campbell, the inspector did not adequately prepare or communicate with him before appearing, and Campbell lost that case. Campbell sought $850,000 for emotional distress, concerns about possible medical problems, damage to personal property, and future losses. He also sought an order requiring disclosures about MI&T’s and the inspector’s credentials and other information.

The court understood Campbell’s main claim to be professional negligence. Although Campbell referred to various statutes and legal authorities in his filings, the court found that he did not describe them clearly enough to identify additional claims. The opinion also notes that the complaint contained no allegations specifically against Pacha, which independently supported dismissing him from the case.

Motion to dismiss

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and gave Campbell’s self-represented filing a liberal reading, but concluded that the complaint still lacked enough facts to state a plausible claim.

Applying Minnesota law, the court explained that professional negligence generally requires a duty to use the care, skill, and diligence ordinarily used in the profession, a breach of that duty, causation, and injury. The court identified the decisive issue as whether Minnesota law recognizes a professional negligence claim against a mold inspector on the allegations in Campbell’s complaint.

The court found no decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, or another federal court establishing that mold inspectors are subject to this type of claim. It reasoned that professional malpractice claims generally involve licensed or regulated professionals, while the opinion found no indication that Minnesota requires mold investigators or remediators to be licensed or certified, or that the mold-inspection field has substantial self-regulation or standardized training. The court therefore concluded that Minnesota law did not support Campbell’s professional negligence claim. It also found no discernible claim based on a contract or ordinary negligence principles.

The defendants asked for dismissal with prejudice, which would bar refiling. The court instead dismissed Campbell’s complaint without prejudice, explaining that Campbell had not received an effective opportunity to amend and might have additional claims or factual allegations that could change the analysis.

Default judgment and attorney disqualification

Campbell moved for default judgment under Rule 55. The court denied that motion. The defendants had been served on January 31, 2022, and timely responded on February 22, 2022, by moving to dismiss. The court also explained that, even if the defendants had failed to respond, the clerk would first have needed to enter default before a motion for default judgment could be filed. The court further found that Campbell’s motion gave an incorrect account of when and how service occurred.

Campbell also moved to disqualify the defendants’ attorneys. The court denied that motion because it did not comply with the local filing rules and did not identify a valid basis for disqualification. The court explained that Campbell’s status as a self-represented litigant did not justify disqualifying opposing counsel, and that his concerns about the attorneys’ licenses and agreements with their clients did not provide a basis for disqualification.

Later complaint

Campbell filed another complaint on March 24, 2022. It used a court-provided form, listed additional or differently named defendants, and included exhibits. The court found it unclear whether Campbell intended this filing to amend the original complaint or supplement it.

The court concluded that, if the filing was intended only to add factual material, it did not change the dismissal analysis. If it was intended as an amended complaint, it was ineffective because Campbell filed it more than 21 days after the defendants’ Rule 12 motion and did not obtain the defendants’ written consent or the court’s permission to amend. The court therefore found that the later complaint was not operative and denied the defendants’ motion directed at that complaint as moot.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint. It denied Campbell’s request for default judgment and his motion to disqualify the defendants’ attorney. It denied as moot the defendants’ motion to dismiss the later complaint, and dismissed the action without prejudice. The court also warned that continued baseless motions or legal or factual positions similar to those in the default-judgment and disqualification motions could create a risk of sanctions.