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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled June 7, 2022

Horizon Roofing, Inc. v. Best And Fast Inc

Judge
Katherine Menendez
Docket
0:22-cv-00046
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
10
Civil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Horizon Roofing v. Best and Fast, Judge Menendez remanded the case for lack of federal jurisdiction and denied the dismissal motion as moot.

Who this affects

Horizon Roofing, Inc., Best and Fast Inc., and B.E.S.T. GDR, LLC; the action returns to Ramsey County District Court, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied as moot.

What happened

Horizon Roofing, Inc. v. Best and Fast Inc. began in Ramsey County District Court, where Horizon claimed that Best and Fast Inc. and B.E.S.T. GDR, LLC unlawfully used Horizon’s trade name for roofing services in Minnesota. The defendants moved the case to federal court, arguing that the claims involved federal trademark law.

The federal court found that Horizon’s complaint asserted only state-law claims and did not invoke the federal Lanham Act. The defendants did not show that the trade-name claims necessarily raised a federal question or that the state claims were disguised federal claims. The court also rejected the argument that the state court’s temporary restraining order made the case removable.

The court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and ordered the case remanded to Ramsey County District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Judge Katherine Menendez also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Horizon Roofing, Inc. v. Best And Fast Inc · No. 0:22-cv-00046
Judge
Katherine Menendez
Date
June 7, 2022

Background

Horizon Roofing, Inc. sued Best and Fast Inc. and B.E.S.T. GDR, LLC in Ramsey County District Court. Horizon alleged that the defendants unlawfully used Horizon’s trade name in Minnesota in connection with roofing-contractor services. The defendants jointly removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that Horizon’s claims depended on ownership and infringement of a trademark and therefore raised a federal question.

The federal court had previously ordered the defendants to submit legal authority supporting federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The defendants filed a memorandum arguing that Horizon’s claims arose under federal law. Horizon opposed that position and requested remand, meaning return of the case to the state court.

Jurisdictional standards

Federal courts must decide whether they have jurisdiction before addressing the merits. Because the defendants removed the case, they had the burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Any doubts about federal jurisdiction had to be resolved in favor of remand.

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal-question jurisdiction generally depends on whether a federal claim appears on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint. A plaintiff may rely exclusively on state law and thereby avoid federal jurisdiction. The artful-pleading doctrine can permit removal when a plaintiff has tried to hide a necessary federal claim, including a state-law claim that is completely and obviously displaced by federal law.

Court’s reasoning

The court concluded that Horizon’s complaint did not assert a claim under the federal Lanham Act, which provides a cause of action under federal trademark law. The complaint did not reference a federal cause of action, and the court found no claim arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The court found no Supreme Court or Eighth Circuit decision establishing that every trade-name-infringement claim necessarily raises a federal question. It also found no court of appeals decision supporting that rule. The cases identified by the court supported the conclusion that a trade-name-infringement claim may arise solely under state law without automatically implicating the Lanham Act or creating federal jurisdiction.

The defendants argued that the artful-pleading doctrine applied, in part because a state court had granted Horizon’s motion for a temporary restraining order and had prohibited the defendants from using the names “Horizon Roofing Repairs” and “Horizon Roofing.” The court rejected that argument. Horizon’s requests for injunctive relief and its trade-name-infringement claim sought to prohibit use of the Horizon name in Minnesota, and Horizon had not invoked a federal cause of action. The defendants also did not establish that the state-law claims were displaced by the Lanham Act.

The court further ruled that the scope of the state court’s pre-removal temporary restraining order did not determine whether the case was removable. The jurisdictional analysis focused on the pleadings, and the defendants cited no authority making removal depend on the scope of pre-removal injunctive relief.

Disposition

The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. It ordered that the matter be remanded to Ramsey County District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied as moot.

The authoritative version

Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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