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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled July 18, 2022

Tealeh v. DeJoy

Judge
Joan Ericksen
Docket
0:21-cv-01318
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
15
EmploymentCivil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro Se
In one sentence

In Tealeh v. DeJoy, Judge Wright granted in part and denied in part the dismissal motion, while denying Tealeh’s other two motions.

Who this affects

Tealeh’s Title VII claims against Postmaster General Louis DeJoy remain subject to the rulings described in the order; the claims against Merrick Garland and Andrew M. Luger were dismissed through the granted portion of the motion to dismiss. Tealeh’s summary-judgment and complaint-hearing motions were denied.

What happened

In Flomo Tealeh v. Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, Merrick Garland, and Andrew M. Luger, Tealeh alleged that the Postal Service discriminated against him based on race and national origin, retaliated against him, and subjected him to a hostile work environment.

The court ruled that claims based on Tealeh’s 2019 administrative complaints were generally too late, but claims based on his 2020 complaints were filed within the required period. It also ruled that some later discrimination and retaliation allegations had not been administratively exhausted, while later conduct could be considered as part of the alleged hostile work environment. The court granted the dismissal motion as to Garland and Luger and denied it as to Postmaster General Louis DeJoy.

The court also denied Tealeh’s motion for summary judgment because it was procedurally deficient and premature before discovery, and denied his unclear motion asking the court to hear his complaint. The order was signed by Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Tealeh v. DeJoy · No. 0:21-cv-01318
Judge
Joan Ericksen
Date
July 18, 2022

Background

Flomo Tealeh, who was employed as a mail handler for the United States Postal Service at a USPS facility in Minneapolis, Minnesota, sued Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland, and United States Attorney Andrew M. Luger. He alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on race and national origin. The amended complaint asserted claims for disparate treatment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.

Tealeh had filed administrative complaints with the USPS Equal Employment Opportunity Office in 2019 and 2020. The 2019 complaint was dismissed on January 13, 2020, with notice that he could appeal or file a federal lawsuit within 90 days. The 2020 complaint was partially accepted and partially dismissed, and the USPS EEO issued a dismissal notice on March 6, 2021. Tealeh filed this lawsuit on June 1, 2021.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The defendants argued that parts of Tealeh’s claims were untimely or had not been exhausted through the administrative EEO process. They also argued that Tealeh alleged no facts supporting claims against Garland and Luger.

Disparate treatment and retaliation. The court held that allegations supporting Tealeh’s disparate-treatment and retaliation claims that were first raised in his 2019 EEO complaint could not be raised in this lawsuit because he did not sue within 90 days after the 2019 dismissal notice and did not allege that he had filed an earlier lawsuit. The court held, however, that the allegations raised in his 2020 EEO complaint were not time barred because Tealeh filed this lawsuit within 90 days of the March 6, 2021 dismissal notice.

The court further held that later disparate-treatment and retaliation allegations involving conduct after Tealeh filed his 2020 EEO complaint had not been administratively exhausted. Tealeh had not alleged that he filed another EEO complaint concerning those later events, so those allegations could not be raised in this lawsuit in the first instance.

Hostile work environment. The court applied a different limitation-period analysis to the hostile-work-environment claim. It explained that conduct outside the filing period may be considered when it is part of a continuing pattern and at least one related act falls within the actionable period. The court therefore held that conduct first raised in the 2019 EEO complaint could remain actionable if it formed part of a pattern related to actionable hostile-work-environment allegations. It also held that later similar conduct could be considered because Tealeh had raised related conduct in his 2020 EEO complaint.

Claims against Garland and Luger. The court granted the motion to dismiss Tealeh’s claims against Garland and Luger because the amended complaint alleged no facts implicating either defendant’s conduct.

The order states that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part: it was granted as to the claims against Garland and Luger and denied as to the claims against DeJoy as addressed in the opinion.

Tealeh’s Motions

The court denied Tealeh’s motion for summary judgment. The motion did not comply with several local filing requirements, including requirements for a meet-and-confer statement, legal memorandum, hearing notice, word-count certificate, and proposed order. The court also found the motion premature because discovery had not yet begun.

The court denied Tealeh’s separate motion to “hear” his complaint because it could not determine the motion’s purpose or the relief requested.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Tealeh’s motion for summary judgment was denied, and his motion to hear his complaint was denied.

The authoritative version

Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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