Tristan J. v. Kijakazi

Background

Tristan J. applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income under Title XVI. He alleged that he had been unable to work since June 13, 2017, because of a traumatic brain injury, neurocognitive disorder, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. The Social Security Administration denied his applications initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge issued an unfavorable decision, and the Appeals Council denied review. Tristan J. then filed this action challenging that decision.

The administrative law judge found that Tristan J. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date and had severe traumatic-brain-injury, neurocognitive, depressive, and anxiety impairments. The judge found that none met or equaled a listed impairment. The judge assessed a residual functional capacity—the most a person can do despite work-related limitations—for light work, with limits on use of the right arm, adapting to routine workplace changes, and traveling. The judge found that Tristan J. could not return to his past work but could perform other jobs, including school bus monitor, furniture rental consultant, and investigator dealer accounts.

Arguments

Tristan J. argued that the residual functional capacity should have included state-agency consultants’ limitations to routine and simple instructions and unskilled work. He argued that the omission required a remand because the vocational expert had not been asked what effect those limitations would have on the available jobs.

The Commissioner argued that any omission was harmless. The Commissioner pointed out that the administrative law judge’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert included the ability to understand, remember, and follow simple routine instructions, and that the jobs identified were unskilled. The court assumed, for purposes of resolving the motions, that the administrative law judge had erred by omitting the limitations from the residual functional capacity.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that judicial review asks whether substantial evidence—relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate—supports the administrative law judge’s decision and whether the decision contains a legal error. An error requires reversal and remand only if it prejudiced the claimant. The claimant bears the burden of showing that the error was not harmless by providing some indication that the administrative law judge would have decided differently.

The court concluded that any error was harmless for two reasons. First, the administrative law judge included the routine-and-simple-instructions limitation in the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert. Second, the jobs identified by the administrative law judge were classified as unskilled work. The court noted that the investigator dealer accounts job appeared to require a reasoning level that may have made it inappropriate for Tristan J.’s limitations, but Tristan J. did not raise that issue. The court also stated that, even without that job, there appeared to be a significant number of other jobs Tristan J. could perform, such as school bus monitor.

Disposition

The court denied Tristan J.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly, leaving the denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income in place. Judge Tony N. Leung signed the order.