Troy L. M. v. Kijakazi

Background

Troy L. M. challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. He alleged disability beginning in September 2017, including because of depression and anxiety. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that he had severe chronic pain syndrome, depression, and generalized anxiety disorder, but determined that he could perform light work with certain restrictions, including simple, routine tasks and occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. The ALJ found that he could perform jobs such as merchandise marker, collator operator, and routing clerk, and therefore concluded that he was not disabled.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Troy L. M. argued that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of Timothy Rasmussen, M.D., his treating psychiatrist, and failed to account for the state-agency psychological consultants’ limitation to brief and superficial contact with coworkers and the public. He later filed a notice of supplemental authority and a motion to remand based on an Appeals Council order in another claimant’s case discussing the meaning of “superficial interaction.”

Evaluation of Dr. Rasmussen’s Opinion

Dr. Rasmussen opined that Troy L. M. had marked or extreme limitations in several work-related mental abilities, would need additional breaks, would have good and bad days, and would miss more than three days of work per month. The ALJ found the opinion unpersuasive because it was not supported by Dr. Rasmussen’s treatment notes, which sometimes described Troy L. M.’s depression as in partial remission or more mild, and because it was inconsistent with daily activities, family relationships, and the record as a whole.

The court concluded that the ALJ properly considered the supportability and consistency factors required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c. Although the ALJ did not cite specific records immediately after the conclusions about those factors, the court read those conclusions in the context of the ALJ’s discussion of the medical records and activities. The court found substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion and declined to reweigh the evidence.

Superficial Interaction Limitation

The court distinguished between “occasional” interaction, which concerns how often interaction occurs, and “superficial” interaction, which concerns the depth or quality of the interaction. The ALJ found the state-agency psychological consultants’ findings generally persuasive, but the residual functional capacity included only a restriction to occasional interaction. The ALJ did not clearly explain whether the superficial-interaction limitation was rejected or whether the occasional-interaction restriction was intended to address both the frequency and quality of social contact.

The court also noted that the vocational expert identified three jobs based on a hypothetical containing the occasional-interaction limitation, but the record did not clearly show that the vocational evidence addressed the separate quality-of-interaction limitation. The court stated that the jobs might remain available after clarification, but concluded that the ALJ’s analysis was incomplete and required remand.

Disposition

The court ordered that Troy L. M.’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Troy L. M.’s notice of supplemental authority and motion to remand was GRANTED IN PART as to the relief sought and otherwise DENIED. The matter was REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. The remand required the ALJ to explain why the superficial-interaction limitation was not included or how the residual functional capacity accounted for it.