Hollie v. Essentia Health Moose Lake Clinic

Background

Shannon Hollie, who is involuntarily civilly committed at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota, sued Essentia Health Moose Lake, Benjamin Marsh, M.D., and unknown individuals. He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal disability statutes, state and federal discrimination statutes, and state law. He alleges that the defendants denied him a penile implant needed to treat erectile dysfunction after a prostatectomy, provided inadequate medical care, discriminated against him because of his status as a sex offender, and altered or falsified his medical records.

Dr. Marsh filed an answer that included eleven asserted affirmative defenses. These included denials of negligence and constitutional violations, causation and damages defenses, a defense based on Minnesota Statute § 145.682’s expert-affidavit requirements for medical-malpractice actions, failure to state a claim, and qualified immunity.

Motion to Strike

Hollie moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike the defenses from Marsh’s answer. Rule 12(f) permits a court to remove an insufficient defense or material that is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. The court explained that striking a pleading is a disfavored remedy and is generally appropriate when doing so would simplify a trial or streamline the case.

The court rejected Hollie’s argument that every defense had to include specific factual allegations. It concluded that the defenses should not be stricken on that basis because district courts disagree about whether the heightened plausibility standard used for complaints applies to affirmative defenses.

The court agreed that Marsh’s first six asserted defenses were not necessarily affirmative defenses that had to be pleaded and proved. But it found no controlling authority requiring their removal and concluded that striking them would not simplify the case. The court also decided that Marsh’s statement that the complaint failed to state a claim should be treated as a denial rather than stricken.

The court declined to strike the qualified-immunity defense. It explained that whether Marsh could be treated as a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability was fact-dependent and that private individuals acting as state actors are not automatically barred from asserting qualified immunity. On the existing record, the court could not determine whether the defense was legally unavailable, so deciding the issue was premature.

The court also declined to strike the defense based on Minnesota Statute § 145.682. Hollie said he was not bringing a state-law medical-malpractice or medical-negligence claim. The court noted that his complaint appeared to assert constitutionally inadequate medical treatment, to which courts apply the deliberate-indifference standard in the Eighth Amendment context, rather than medical malpractice. Although the court doubted that § 145.682 applied, it found no controlling authority clearly foreclosing the defense at that stage.

Disposition

Judge Katherine Menendez denied Hollie’s motion to strike Marsh’s affirmative defenses. The order addressed only whether the defenses should remain in Marsh’s answer; it did not decide the underlying claims.