Dahir v. Bolin

Background

A Minnesota state jury convicted Bakil Dahir of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by keeping Juror A on the jury. Juror A had said that his wife had previously been sexually assaulted and expressed concerns about his impartiality, but he also said he would try to be impartial. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied further review.

Dahir then filed a federal petition asking for relief from his state conviction. He argued that keeping Juror A violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury. Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty recommended that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. Dahir objected to that recommendation.

Court’s Analysis

The district court reviewed the portions of the recommendation to which Dahir objected. Under the federal habeas statute, a federal court may grant relief from a state-court decision only when the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Dahir argued that Patton v. Yount required a prospective juror to swear that the juror could set aside any opinion, rather than merely stating that the juror would try to be impartial. The court disagreed. It explained that Patton recognized that prospective jurors’ answers may be ambiguous or contradictory and that trial judges are best positioned to assess their impartiality. The court agreed that Juror A’s statement that he would try to be objective supported the state court’s decision.

The court also rejected Dahir’s reliance on Dennis v. United States, explaining that Dennis involved whether a government employee should automatically be removed from a jury, which was not the issue in Dahir’s case. The court found Morgan v. Illinois distinguishable because it concerned whether jurors could be excluded based on views about imposing the death penalty. The court also concluded that a Minnesota state-court decision did not itself establish a violation of the federal standard required for habeas relief.

The court found the circumstances different from those in Irvin v. Dowd, where extensive publicity had led jurors to form opinions about the defendant’s guilt. The opinion states that Juror A did not say he knew anything about Dahir’s case or had formed an opinion about his guilt. Instead, he said he would try to put aside his personal experiences and consider the evidence objectively. The court concluded that the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Disposition

Judge Menendez accepted the Report and Recommendation, overruled Dahir’s objections, denied Dahir’s petition, dismissed the action with prejudice, and did not issue a certificate of appealability. A certificate of appealability is required for a habeas petitioner to appeal only when the petitioner has made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied.