White v. Dayton

Background

This Report and Recommendation addresses eight related lawsuits: White v. Dayton, No. 11-cv-3702; Scott v. Dayton, No. 11-cv-3714; Davidson v. Dayton, No. 11-cv-3733; Fries v. Dayton, No. 12-cv-0062; Hajek v. Dayton, No. 12-cv-0343; Hartleib v. Dayton, No. 12-cv-0344; Stevens v. Dayton, No. 12-cv-0495; and Williams v. Dayton, No. 12-cv-0881. The plaintiffs are involuntary civil detainees at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, or MSOP. Each complaint asserted the same 21 causes of action and relied on substantially similar factual allegations.

The cases had been stayed while a related class action was pending. After final judgment in that class action, the court lifted the stays. Because all eight plaintiffs had applied to proceed without paying filing fees, their complaints were subject to an initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That statute requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek money from a defendant who is immune from that relief.

Personal-capacity claims

The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants in both their personal capacities and their official capacities. A personal-capacity claim seeks to hold an individual government official liable for that person’s own actions. The court concluded that the complaints did not plausibly connect specific defendants to specific unlawful conduct. Instead, the complaints generally attributed nearly every alleged action to nearly every defendant. The court therefore recommended dismissing all personal-capacity claims without prejudice.

Official-capacity claims against state officials

An official-capacity claim is generally treated as a claim against the government entity the official represents. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials who might have authority to change MSOP policies, but could not seek money damages from state officials in their official capacities.

The court recommended dismissing without prejudice the following claims from each case:

- Ground One, alleging a failure to provide treatment, because the claim was barred by the judgment in the earlier related class action; - the unlawful-search claims in Ground Three concerning room searches and unclothed body searches, because the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a constitutional violation and similar claims had already been litigated; - Ground Four, alleging invasion of privacy; - Ground Five, concerning access to legal materials and counsel, because the plaintiffs did not allege actual injury or prejudice; - Ground Six and Ground Twenty, concerning denial of liberty, because they were duplicative, unclear, or barred to the extent they challenged the legality of detention itself; - Ground Seven, concerning religious freedom, because the complaints contained no factual allegations about the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs or practices; - Ground Eight, concerning a less restrictive alternative placement, because the claim was barred by the earlier class action; - Ground Ten, alleging double jeopardy, because the claims impermissibly challenged the legality of the plaintiffs’ detention under the rule discussed in Heck v. Humphrey; - Ground Twelve, alleging conspiracy, because the complaints did not adequately allege a meeting of the minds or discriminatory purpose; - Grounds Thirteen and Fourteen, alleging intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; - Ground Fifteen, alleging impairment of contract obligations, because the plaintiffs did not identify a contractual relationship that the State had impaired; - Ground Sixteen, alleging negligent hiring and credentialing; - Ground Eighteen, alleging supervisory liability, because the complaints did not allege deliberate indifference by supervisors; - Ground Nineteen, alleging a violation of state police powers, because the claim was vague and also challenged the legality of detention; and - Ground Twenty-One, alleging violation of an oath of office.

The court recommended allowing five categories of claims to proceed against state defendants in their official capacities: Ground Two, challenging certain speech restrictions; the property-seizure portion of Ground Three; Ground Nine, alleging cruel and unusual punishment; Ground Eleven, alleging inadequate procedural protections; and Ground Seventeen, alleging that the totality of MSOP conditions violated constitutional rights. The court emphasized that allowing these claims to proceed at the initial review stage did not prevent defendants from later raising defenses under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Claims against county officials

Each lawsuit also named one county official. The court recommended dismissing those defendants without prejudice because the complaints did not plausibly allege that the county officials had violated the plaintiffs’ rights or had authority to change the MSOP policies at issue.

Other claims

The court recommended dismissing any claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act because the complaints did not allege that the plaintiffs were disabled within the meaning of those statutes or were treated differently because of a disability. It also recommended dismissing most claims based directly on the Minnesota Constitution because Minnesota generally does not recognize private remedies for such violations. The court separately rejected the religious-liberty claim under the Minnesota Constitution as factually conclusory.

Orders and recommendation

The court granted all eight applications to proceed without paying filing fees. It granted the listed motions by six plaintiffs not to dismiss their cases for failure to prosecute. It denied the requests for appointed counsel made by Joseph Allen Hajek, Lloyd Hartleib, Karl Godfrey Stevens, and Dale Allen Williams, Sr. The court directed the U.S. Marshals Service to serve the state defendants in their official capacities, but not the listed county defendants unless otherwise ordered, and extended the defendants’ response deadline until 35 days after the Report and Recommendation was resolved.

Judge Dulce J. Foster stated that the Report and Recommendation was not an order or judgment of the District Court and was not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit. The parties could file specific written objections within the period described in the notice.