Glover v. Wells Fargo Bank
- Katherine Menendez
- 0:22-cv-01459
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 14
In Glover v. Wells Fargo Bank, Judge Menendez granted defendants’ dismissal motion, dismissing all claims against individual defendants and specified claims with prejudice.
Wilbert Glover’s claims against the individual defendants and his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and Minn. Stat. § 363A.12 were dismissed with prejudice. The order did not rule on his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 or Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims against Wells Fargo Bank.
What happened
In Glover v. Wells Fargo Bank, Wilbert Glover, representing himself, alleged that Wells Fargo employees and the bank denied him credit and customer services because he is Black. He cited federal and state laws, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and laws protecting contracts and property rights from racial discrimination.
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed with prejudice all claims against the individual defendants and all claims under the federal jurisdiction statute, the attorney-fee statute, and the Minnesota public-services discrimination statute. The court did not decide whether Glover adequately stated his contract, property-rights, or equal-credit-opportunity claims against Wells Fargo itself because the defendants had not challenged those claims as to Wells Fargo.
Judge Katherine Menendez signed the January 18, 2023 order.
The detailed version
- Glover v. Wells Fargo Bank · No. 0:22-cv-01459
- Katherine Menendez
- Jan. 18, 2023
Background
Wilbert Glover brought the case without a lawyer against Wells Fargo Bank and Karen Lawson, Amber H., Destiny R., Brittany, Ajzhanb, and Maria. He alleged that defendants denied him equal credit opportunities because of his race, in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and asserted claims based on several other statutes.
The complaint described denied credit-card applications, a denied auto-loan application, a denied mortgage-loan application, disputed customer-service interactions, failure to provide a debit card, a monthly account fee, and interactions with Wells Fargo employees. It included allegations of racial statements and conduct by some Wells Fargo personnel. Glover cited 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1988, and 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
Defendants’ Motion
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. They argued that the complaint failed to state claims against the individual defendants, that some claims failed against all defendants, and that Glover had not properly served the individual defendants.
The court applied the rule that a complaint must contain enough factual detail to make a claim plausible, while also giving the complaint the more flexible reading generally provided to a person representing himself. The court stated that it could not add facts or create a legal theory that Glover had not pleaded.
Court’s Analysis
The court concluded that § 1331 provides federal-question jurisdiction but does not itself create a claim for relief. Any claim based directly on § 1331 therefore failed.
The court dismissed the claim under Minn. Stat. § 363A.12 because that statute concerns discrimination in access to a “public service,” which Minnesota law defines as a public facility or governmental entity. The complaint did not allege facts showing that Wells Fargo or the individual defendants qualified as a public service.
The court construed Glover’s reference to “12 U.S.C. § 1988” as a reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which permits certain prevailing parties to seek reasonable attorney’s fees. It held that Glover could not recover attorney’s fees as a person representing himself and dismissed any § 1988 claim.
The court dismissed the claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 against the individual defendants. Those statutes protect against racial discrimination involving contracts and certain property rights, and the court found that the allegations did not plausibly show that the individual defendants themselves acted with discriminatory intent. The court specifically discussed the allegations concerning Destiny R., Amber H., Brittany, Ajzhanb, Maria, and Lawson and found them conclusory or lacking facts connecting each person’s conduct to intentional racial discrimination.
The court also dismissed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims against the individual defendants. It reasoned that the complaint did not allege that those individuals were creditors or that their alleged conduct involved a credit transaction. The allegations concerning the individuals involved complaints about customer service, a debit card, a money order, or the return of a debit card rather than an aspect of a credit transaction.
The court did not address the defendants’ service argument because it had already dismissed all claims against the individual defendants for failure to state a claim. The court also did not decide whether the complaint adequately stated § 1981, § 1982, or Equal Credit Opportunity Act claims against Wells Fargo, because the defendants’ motion did not challenge those claims as to Wells Fargo.
Disposition
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. All claims against Karen Lawson, Amber H., Destiny R., Brittany, Ajzhanb, and Maria were dismissed with prejudice. All claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and Minn. Stat. § 363A.12, subdivision 1, were also dismissed with prejudice.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.