Larson v. Minnesota Sex Offender Program, the

Background

Hollis J. Larson, who was civilly committed under the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, sued the program and its staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law, alleging various forms of maltreatment. The case had been stayed while a related class action was pending. After that case ended, Larson asked Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster to appoint a lawyer for him.

Magistrate Judge Foster found that Larson’s amended complaint had a legally supportable basis for relief and allowed him to proceed without paying the filing fee in the district-court case. In the same order, she denied his request for appointed counsel.

Issue and analysis

Larson appealed the denial of appointed counsel directly to the Eighth Circuit and asked the district court for permission to proceed on appeal without paying the filing fee. Under federal law, a person who cannot afford the fee may apply to proceed without paying it. But a person may not proceed without paying the fee if the appeal is not taken in good faith. An appeal is considered made in good faith when it raises an objectively nonfrivolous issue—an issue with an arguable legal or factual basis.

The court found that Larson’s proposed appeal was legally frivolous because the magistrate judge’s order could not be appealed directly to the Eighth Circuit. Magistrate judges may decide certain nondispositive pretrial matters, meaning matters that do not finally resolve a claim. A party generally must challenge such an order first before the assigned district judge, unless the parties expressly consented to the magistrate judge’s authority to enter final decisions. The court stated that a denial of appointed counsel is a nondispositive matter and that Larson therefore had to challenge it in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and the district’s local rules.

Ruling

Judge John R. Tunheim denied Larson’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal at Docket No. 42. The court did not decide the merits of Larson’s allegations of maltreatment or his request for appointed counsel. It encouraged Larson to challenge the magistrate judge’s order in the district court and stated that any objection received within 14 days after the date of this order would be treated as timely because Larson had attempted to appeal within the original 14-day period.