Brown v. Pfeiffer

Background

Shatara Brown, Nikoe Lee, and Colleana Young were tenants of defendant Reese Pfeiffer and his business partner, former defendant Michael Fruen. The properties were owned by Pfeiffer and Fruen’s company, defendant Fruen & Pfeiffer LLP, and managed by defendant M Fruen Properties LLC. The plaintiffs alleged that Pfeiffer sexually harassed them by offering rent discounts or other benefits for sexual favors and threatening eviction or other rental consequences if they refused.

The plaintiffs’ case was consolidated for pretrial purposes with a Fair Housing Act case brought by the government. The parties later agreed to a consent decree in both cases. Among other things, the decree barred Pfeiffer from directly or indirectly performing property-management responsibilities at any residential rental property. It also discharged unpaid rent for 23 identified tenants, with defendants agreeing to forgive $32,000 for each. Defendants paid $736,000 to those tenants, a $14,000 civil penalty, and $140,000 in attorney’s fees to Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid. The court approved the decree in October 2021 and retained jurisdiction to enforce its terms.

The Motion

Defendants’ motion did not seek enforcement of the consent decree’s terms. Instead, they sought to enforce a temporary restraining order entered in December 2019. That order barred defendants from evicting Brown or terminating her lease. It did not require a bond because Brown represented that she would pay her share of the monthly rent into a Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid escrow account.

Defendants claimed that Brown had not deposited rent for three months, totaling $1,202. They asked the court to require her to pay the alleged unpaid rent. Brown argued that defendants had an accounting showing the amounts deposited before they agreed to the consent decree and therefore had waived any claim to the unpaid rent.

Analysis

The court rejected defendants’ asserted bases for jurisdiction, meaning the legal authority to decide the motion.

First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 did not support jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order did not specify the amount Brown was required to pay or impose another specific requirement concerning the promised escrow payments. In addition, the order expired on January 24, 2020. The rents at issue were due in February 2020 or later, after the order had expired, so Brown did not violate the order or the rule by failing to deposit those amounts into escrow.

Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70 did not apply. That rule allows a court to enforce a judgment requiring a party to perform a specific act. The temporary restraining order did not require Brown to perform a specific act, and the rents at issue were not covered by any possible payment requirement because they became due after the order expired.

Third, the court rejected defendants’ argument that it had ancillary jurisdiction, meaning limited authority connected to another federal judgment. The only judgment was the consent decree, and it did not require Brown to pay defendants anything. The court also found no extraordinary circumstances that would justify using ancillary jurisdiction to impose such a payment obligation.

Disposition

The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over defendants’ motion and therefore denied it. The court did not reach Brown’s arguments that defendants had waived their claim to unpaid rent or failed to mitigate their damages.

On January 31, 2023, Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright ordered that defendants’ motion to enforce judgment, Docket 177, was denied.