Center for Biological Diversity v. Strommen

Background

The case concerned Minnesota’s trapping regulations and their effect on Canada lynx. The opinion states that the lynx has been classified as threatened under the Endangered Species Act since 2000. Under that law, taking a threatened species—including trapping it—is generally unlawful unless an exception applies.

In an earlier round of this dispute, a court ordered the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to apply for a federal permit covering incidental takes of lynx and to develop regulations intended to reduce lynx deaths from trapping. The federal government had not acted on the permit application by the time of this case. The Center for Biological Diversity later filed this action, alleging that the DNR’s revised regulations remained ineffective and that lynx continued to be taken unlawfully.

The DNR moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The motion was denied in an earlier order. The court previously determined that the Center adequately alleged standing and a plausible claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, and that the earlier judgment did not bar this case under claim-preclusion principles.

Proposed consent decree

The Center and the DNR jointly asked the court to approve a consent decree. A consent decree is a court-enforceable settlement. The proposed decree required the DNR to maintain existing trapping restrictions in the Lynx Management Zone and add restrictions on trapping equipment and placement.

The additional restrictions included requirements that certain snares have a loop stop, use a one-piece snare lock without moving parts or attached compression springs, and have a contacting side at least one-half inch wide. The decree also restricted attaching or placing snares near fences, trees, and certain rooted vegetation. It limited some snare cables to seven feet and restricted certain foothold traps with jaws opening more than six and one-half inches. The DNR also had to take public-education steps, including issuing a press release and posting the restrictions on its website.

The Minnesota Trappers Association, National Trappers Association, and Fur Takers of America, Inc. intervened as defendants. They opposed the decree and requested either denial or an evidentiary hearing. The court held the hearing, heard testimony from witnesses for the DNR and the intervenors, and received additional briefing.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that it could not simply approve the decree without review. It had to determine whether the settlement was procedurally and substantively fair, reasonable, adequate, within the court’s jurisdiction, within the scope of the pleadings, and consistent with the governing law. The court also emphasized that a consent decree is not reviewed as though it were a judgment reached after a trial on the merits, and that the court did not need to decide whether the settlement was the best possible agreement.

The court found no reason to question the Center’s and DNR’s assertion that their negotiations were conducted in good faith and at arm’s length. The intervenors did not challenge the earlier standing, claim-preclusion, or merits-related determinations, and they did not challenge the decree’s procedural fairness.

The court rejected the intervenors’ argument that the decree improperly required emergency rulemaking. It concluded that the Minnesota emergency-rulemaking provisions cited by the intervenors did not contain the asserted requirement they relied on. The DNR instead intended to use a different statutory provision for expedited emergency rulemaking. The court noted that the precise extent of the DNR’s authority under that provision was not plainly manifest, but did not decide that question because the intervenors had not specifically challenged the DNR’s authority in that respect.

The court also rejected the argument that the decree was unreasonable because the record did not identify a past lynx death that each new restriction would have prevented. The court held that a settlement need not address every past harm or provide every remedy a party might have sought at trial. It found that reducing mortality risk to lynx caught in snares was a reasonable goal and that the decree represented a reasonable compromise between the Center’s and DNR’s positions.

The court upheld the loop-stop requirement based largely on DNR wildlife biologist Dr. John D. Erb’s testimony that it would substantially, if not fully, eliminate mortality caused by constriction pressure on lynx neck arteries. The court acknowledged that some supporting evidence involved other species but found that the intervenors did not show why that evidence failed to support Dr. Erb’s opinions about lynx. The court found the intervenors’ witness, Mr. Bert Highland, credible and experienced, but concluded that his testimony did not establish that the requirement was unreasonable.

The court rejected objections to the snare-lock requirement. Evidence showed that cam locks were used by 17 percent of trappers in the Midwest survey region, and the court found that several popular snare locks would remain lawful. The court also found no evidence that the cost of replacement locks was unduly burdensome. It concluded that the restriction was reasonably related to reducing snare lethality and did not need to remedy every past lynx taking.

Finally, the court upheld restrictions on anchoring snares to fences or trees and placing them where they could reach certain rooted vegetation. The court found that these restrictions would reduce the risk of entanglement and increased lethality. Although the court recognized that using stakes in frozen or rocky ground could be difficult, it found that the burdens identified by the intervenors could reasonably be addressed and were not substantial enough to require rejection of the decree.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that the Center’s and DNR’s joint motion to enter the consent decree was GRANTED. The Center’s motion to consider the declaration was GRANTED. The intervenor defendants’ motion in limine—a motion seeking to exclude evidence—was DENIED. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.