Chey v. HRI Properties, LLC

Background

Timothy Chey alleged that, on June 13, 2021, he took a hotel shuttle to Terminal 1 at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. The shuttle stopped in a drop-off lane, requiring him to step onto the roadway, walk around the front of the shuttle, and reach the sidewalk. A black sedan then drove slowly in the main traffic lane and moved slightly away from him. Chey alleged that the sedan was heading toward him, caused him to fear for his life, and later caused severe emotional distress.

Chey also alleged that Metropolitan Airports Commission Chief Executive Officer Brian Ryks told him that immediate steps were being taken and that security guards would be installed. Chey said airport personnel later called and emailed him with questions. His amended complaint asserted seven claims: fraud and deceit, breach of implied contract, strict liability, false advertising under the Minnesota False Statements in Advertising Act, negligence and gross negligence, negligence per se, and negligent misrepresentation.

Motion-to-Dismiss Standard

The Commission moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to make a legal claim plausible. The court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true at this stage but does not accept unsupported legal conclusions as facts.

The court noted that Chey was appearing without a lawyer but described himself as a consumer litigation attorney and identified himself as a partner and attorney at law. The court therefore held him to the same pleading standard as an attorney rather than applying the usual leniency given to people representing themselves.

Statutory Immunity

The court held that Minnesota’s statutory, or discretionary, immunity protected the Commission from Chey’s strict-liability, false-advertising, negligence and gross-negligence, and negligence-per-se claims. This immunity generally protects policy-level government decisions, rather than ordinary day-to-day operations.

The court characterized the challenged airport traffic pattern, shuttle drop-off policy, terminal design, safety program, and promised changes to traffic procedures as policy and planning decisions. It relied in part on an earlier Minnesota Court of Appeals decision involving the Commission’s decision not to build a pedestrian walkway at the airport. The court dismissed these claims with prejudice.

Fraud and Deceit

The court dismissed Chey’s fraud claim with prejudice. It found that the alleged statements by Ryks—that immediate steps were being taken and security guards would be installed—were general statements about future action and were not pleaded with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Chey also did not adequately allege that Ryks intended him to rely on the statements, that he actually relied on them, or that he suffered financial damages because of that reliance.

The allegations about unidentified airport personnel also failed. Chey did not identify specific false statements, and his allegation that personnel purposefully lied was too vague and conclusory. He also did not allege reliance or financial damages resulting from the alleged questioning.

Negligent Misrepresentation

The court dismissed Chey’s negligent-misrepresentation claim. The complaint identified broad subjects, such as airport and shuttle safety, but did not identify the specific false information, time, place, or content of any alleged misrepresentation. The court also found no allegations of financial damages, justifiable reliance, or a failure by the Commission to use reasonable care in communicating information.

Breach of Implied Contract

The court dismissed Chey’s implied-contract claim. It found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Chey and the Commission mutually intended to enter a contract requiring particular airport safety protocols. The complaint’s statement that an implied contract existed between the airport and passengers was conclusory and did not identify facts showing a shared agreement.

The court separately found that Chey had not alleged recoverable damages. He alleged emotional distress but no medical care, economic harm, physical injury, or physical injury caused by the distress. The court also found no adequately pleaded independent, willful tort that could support emotional-distress damages for breach of contract.

Disposition

Judge Katherine Menendez granted the Metropolitan Airports Commission’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the matter with prejudice and directed that judgment be entered.