Zachary J. E. v. Kijakazi
- Tony Leung
- 0:22-cv-00101
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 47
In Zachary J. E. v. Kijakazi, Judge Leung denied his summary-judgment motion and granted the Commissioner’s, leaving benefits denied.
Zachary J. E., whose applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income remained denied; the Commissioner of Social Security prevailed.
What happened
In Zachary J. E. v. Kijakazi, Zachary J. E. challenged the denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. He argued that his diabetic neuropathy caused a serious mental limitation and that the administrative law judge should have imposed stricter limits on standing, walking, and absences from work.
The court found that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s decision. The evidence showed that Zachary had neuropathy and pain, but treatment records repeatedly noted intact attention and concentration, and other evidence showed daily activities and improved functioning. The court also upheld the administrative law judge’s decision not to adopt the more restrictive opinions from Zachary’s doctor and psychologist.
Judge Tony N. Leung denied Zachary’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. The order therefore left the denial of both benefit applications in place.
The detailed version
- Zachary J. E. v. Kijakazi · No. 0:22-cv-00101
- Tony Leung
- Mar. 20, 2023
Background
Zachary J. E. challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act and supplemental security income under Title XVI. The opinion noted that the complaint was unclear about whether Zachary challenged one or both applications, but the record showed that both applications were denied, so the court addressed both.
Zachary alleged disability beginning in October 2015 based on conditions including type 1 diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, depression, anxiety, and panic disorder. After an initial administrative law judge decision, the Appeals Council vacated that decision and sent the matter back for further proceedings. The administrative law judge held a second hearing and again found that Zachary was not disabled. The administrative law judge determined that Zachary could perform a limited range of sedentary work, including work as a visual inspector and coil inspector.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court reviewed the administrative law judge’s decision to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate.
Listing 11.14B and mental functioning
Zachary argued that his neuropathy met Listing 11.14B because it caused a marked limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. That listing requires a marked limitation in physical functioning and a marked limitation in at least one area of mental functioning. For purposes of the motions, the court assumed that Zachary had the required marked physical limitation and focused on his mental functioning.
The administrative law judge found only a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported that finding. Mental-health providers repeatedly recorded no concerns about Zachary’s attention and concentration, including during periods when he reported increased pain or mental-health symptoms. The record also showed activities requiring persistence and concentration, such as watching movies, using and learning about computers, maintaining a church website, playing music, driving, and playing video games. The court also noted that Zachary prepared meals, cared for his young daughter, and performed other daily activities.
The administrative law judge found the opinions of psychologist David H. Moll and Dr. Harold Hellweg unpersuasive regarding the extent of Zachary’s concentration problems. The court noted that Zachary did not challenge those assessments directly and concluded that the administrative law judge had sufficient grounds for relying on the treatment records, mental-status examinations, reports of improved functioning, and daily activities. The court therefore held that the neuropathy did not meet Listing 11.14B.
Residual functional capacity
Zachary also argued that the administrative law judge should have adopted Dr. Hellweg’s opinions that he could sit and stand or walk for less than two hours during an eight-hour workday, needed to change positions, and would need to be absent more than four days per month. Dr. Hellweg also offered an opinion that Zachary needed additional walking breaks and would need to elevate his legs for prolonged periods.
The administrative law judge instead found that Zachary could sit for about six hours and stand and walk for about one hour each during an eight-hour workday, with standing and walking limited to 30-minute intervals. The administrative law judge relied on the documented loss of sensation in Zachary’s feet, while also considering the lack of consistent findings of edema, loss of strength, balance problems, or abnormal gait. The administrative law judge also considered Zachary’s activities of daily living, treatment history, and reports of improvement with more consistent treatment.
The court concluded that the administrative law judge adequately evaluated Dr. Hellweg’s opinions under the applicable regulations. Those regulations require consideration of an opinion’s supportability and consistency with the record, along with other factors; supportability and consistency are the most important factors. The court found sufficient grounds for the administrative law judge to regard Dr. Hellweg’s standing and walking opinions as poorly supported, inconsistent with other evidence, and imprecise. The court also concluded that the administrative law judge properly considered the medical expert’s testimony and that substantial evidence supported the standing and walking limits adopted.
Absenteeism
Zachary argued that the administrative law judge should have included an absenteeism limitation based on his pain, nausea, fatigue, mental impairments, and the opinions of Dr. Hellweg and Moll. The vocational expert testified that missing more than one day per month would effectively prevent employment in the relevant jobs.
The administrative law judge found Dr. Hellweg’s absenteeism opinion speculative and inconsistent with the record. The administrative law judge found Moll’s opinion unpersuasive in part because Zachary had lost his last two jobs for misconduct rather than impairment-related reasons. The court acknowledged that the record contained periods of increased pain, nausea, fatigue, depression, anxiety, and hospitalization. It also found substantial evidence of improved mood and functioning, more stable mental-health examinations, reduced nausea with treatment, and improved functioning after the cessation of opiate abuse. The court therefore concluded that the administrative law judge reasonably rejected the proposed absenteeism limitation.
Disposition
The court ordered that Zachary J. E.’s motion for summary judgment was DENIED and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.
Read the full 47-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.