Smith v. Eischen

Background

Darrell D. Smith, who was incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ treatment of time credits available under the First Step Act. He was serving an aggregated 175-month prison term followed by three years of supervised release for aggravated identity theft and wire fraud. His projected release date, using Good Conduct Time credit, was October 1, 2029.

The First Step Act allows eligible federal prisoners to earn credits for successful participation in evidence-based recidivism-reduction programming and productive activities. Smith argued that the Bureau had miscalculated his credits, including by excluding a 24-day period when he was in transit between facilities. He also argued that the Bureau should immediately combine his First Step Act credits with Good Conduct Time credits and other possible early-release avenues when calculating his projected release date and Percentage of Statutory Term Served. He further claimed that the delay affected possible release to home confinement.

The Bureau initially argued that Smith had not exhausted his administrative remedies, that his calculation claim was moot because it had already calculated his credits, and that his application claim was premature. After the Bureau issued its final administrative response, it conceded that Smith had exhausted his remedies but continued to defend the calculation and application of the credits.

First Step Act credit calculation

As of October 7, 2022, the Bureau determined that Smith could earn 15 First Step Act credit days for each 30-day period of successful programming. It calculated that he had earned 675 days, excluding a 24-day period from October 9, 2021, through November 1, 2021, when he was in transit between facilities.

The court agreed that the 24-day period could be excluded because temporary transfer to another government agency does not count as successful participation under the governing regulation. It also rejected Smith’s argument that he should receive extra credits for the number of hours he spent in the UNICOR program and an Apprenticeship Quality Control course, or for participating in multiple programs during the same period. The statute awards credits based on days of participation, not the number of programs completed or the difficulty of a particular program. The court noted that Smith’s later summary-judgment motion appeared to concede that the Bureau had properly calculated his earned credits. It recommended denying the petition to the extent it challenged that calculation.

Application of First Step Act credits

The court distinguished Good Conduct Time credits from First Step Act credits. Good Conduct Time credits are reflected in an inmate’s projected release date under a mandatory statutory scheme. First Step Act credits, by contrast, are conditional: the Bureau may apply them only when statutory and regulatory requirements are met, including that the earned credits equal the remainder of the inmate’s prison term. First Step Act credits can also be lost for violating program requirements or rules or for failing to maintain the required recidivism-risk status.

Because Smith had more than 2,300 days remaining on his sentence when the report and recommendation was issued, his 675 days of First Step Act credits did not equal the remainder of his sentence. The court therefore concluded that the Bureau did not have to apply those credits immediately to Smith’s projected release date or Percentage of Statutory Term Served. The court also concluded that the number of credits Smith would ultimately be able to use remained speculative because he could lose credits or fail to satisfy other requirements.

The court further concluded that Smith was not entitled to a particular type or place of detention. It stated that the Bureau has exclusive authority to decide whether a prisoner should be placed in home confinement and that neither the First Step Act nor the CARES Act changed that authority.

Pending motions and disposition

The court denied Smith’s letter motion seeking permission to file an additional response because the existing record was sufficient. It recommended denying his motion for leave to file a summary-judgment motion and his summary-judgment motion because they repeated his First Step Act arguments and summary judgment was not the proper vehicle for deciding the habeas petition.

Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster ordered the letter motion denied and recommended that Smith’s § 2241 petition be denied, that both summary-judgment-related motions be denied, and that the matter be dismissed with prejudice. The opinion is labeled an order and report and recommendation and states that it was not directly appealable to the Eighth Circuit; objections could be filed under the applicable local rule. The supplied case metadata identifies Nancy Brasel as the judge, but the opinion was signed by Dulce J. Foster as United States Magistrate Judge.