Evans v. Krook

Background

Benjamin Evans was experiencing a suicidal episode and was holding a handgun to his head while kneeling in a crosswalk. Officers negotiated with him for about 40 minutes. Evans repeatedly said he did not intend to hurt the officers, removed the gun’s magazine, and said the remaining bullet was for himself. He also repeatedly turned to look behind himself.

At about 12:57 a.m., while Evans was speaking with officers and turning to look behind himself, Brian J. Krook fired four shots. Krook then fired additional shots as officers approached Evans. Evans never fired his gun and later died at a hospital. The parties disputed whether the gun was pointed toward the officers during the first shots and whether Evans was dropping or had already dropped the gun when Krook fired the later shots.

Summary judgment on Krook’s use of force

The plaintiff brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for constitutional violations by government officials. Krook sought summary judgment and asserted qualified immunity, which can protect government officials from damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

The court denied summary judgment as to the claim against Krook. Applying the constitutional standard for excessive force, the court held that genuine disputes of material fact prevented it from deciding whether Krook’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. The available video did not conclusively show whether Evans’s gun pointed toward Krook or another officer. Other evidence also supported competing accounts, including testimony from officers who said they did not feel an immediate threat and evidence that Evans had made similar movements throughout the standoff.

The court also found that the relevant constitutional rule was clearly established by April 12, 2018. Under that rule, holding a gun to one’s own head was not by itself enough to justify deadly force; the person had to point the firearm at another person or take similar threatening action. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Evans did not pose an immediate threat to anyone other than himself. The court separately denied summary judgment concerning Krook’s fifth, sixth, and seventh shots because the evidence could support a finding that Evans was dropping or had dropped the gun.

Summary judgment on the County’s failure-to-train claim

The plaintiff also claimed that Washington County failed to train its deputies to give proper warnings before using deadly force. The court found that the complaint gave the County adequate notice of this claim, but it granted summary judgment for the County because the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional acts or show that inadequate training caused Krook to shoot Evans.

The court noted that the record showed only one other County officer-involved shooting, decades earlier, and that County training bulletins instructed deputies to warn people that deadly force might be used when reasonable. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the claim against Washington County and dismissed the County from the action with prejudice.

Motion to strike Exhibit 3

The court denied Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3. The exhibit combined audio and video from the incident and included brightened video and still images showing Evans’s movements. The court concluded that any discovery nondisclosure was harmless, that creating the exhibit did not require an expert, and that the attorney-witness rule did not provide a basis to exclude the exhibit at that stage.

Motion concerning Dr. Justin King

The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to exclude Dr. King’s reports and testimony. The court granted the motion as to King’s opinions about lost wages from work as a physician’s assistant and as an emergency medical technician, precluding testimony on those theories at trial. The court denied the motion as to King’s firefighter wage-loss theory, finding that challenges to the assumptions underlying that opinion went to its weight rather than its admissibility.

The court also granted the motion insofar as the plaintiff must allow Defendants to depose King reasonably before trial. Plaintiff’s counsel must pay Defendants’ reasonable costs and attorney’s fees for preparing for and taking that deposition. The order states that the motion was granted in part and denied in part.

Motion concerning Jeffrey Noble

The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion concerning Jeffrey Noble. The court found that Plaintiff’s disclosure of Noble’s expert report did not comply fully with the requirements for retained experts, including requirements concerning the report’s signature, supporting facts and data, curriculum vitae, prior testimony, publications, and compensation.

The court declined to exclude Noble from testifying altogether. Instead, it granted the motion insofar as Plaintiff must allow Defendants to depose Noble reasonably before trial, with Plaintiff’s counsel responsible for the reasonable costs and attorney’s fees of that deposition. The court denied all other requested relief concerning Noble and denied Defendants’ separate request for additional fees incurred in bringing the motion. The order states that this motion was also granted in part and denied in part.

Order

Judge Michael J. Davis ordered that Defendants’ summary-judgment motion was granted in part and denied in part: it was denied as to the § 1983 claim against Brian J. Krook and granted as to the § 1983 claim against Washington County, which was dismissed with prejudice. The motion to strike was denied. The motions concerning Dr. King and Jeffrey Noble were each granted in part and denied in part as specified above.