Purdy v. LeJeune

Background

Jeffrey Colin Purdy filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ handling of First Step Act time credits. He alleged that the Bureau denied or removed credits, used an incorrect rate for earning them, applied an alleged 18-month restriction on using them, and failed to provide the early transfer or release he believed the credits supported. He also claimed due-process violations and sought transfer to a residential reentry center or home confinement.

Purdy separately filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, and a motion to expand the record. The warden responded that some credit issues had been corrected through a Bureau-wide recalculation, that Purdy had not earned enough credits to apply them to the remainder of his sentence, and that the Bureau—not the court—had authority to decide prisoner placement.

Rulings on the Record and Exhaustion

The court granted Purdy’s Motion to Expand the Record and considered the attached materials.

The court treated Purdy’s first ground as a request to waive the judicially created requirement that federal prisoners generally use available prison administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241. Because the warden did not rebut Purdy’s position that the process was unavailable or futile, the court recommended waiving the exhaustion requirement in this case.

First Step Act Time-Credit Claims

The court recommended that the petition be denied except insofar as Purdy asserted a claim about the rate at which he earned First Step Act time credits.

The court recommended denying as moot the portion of the claim concerning credits allegedly disallowed because of Purdy’s time in a special housing unit, incomplete needs assessments, or refusal status in a residential drug-abuse program. The Bureau’s January 2023 recalculation showed no disallowed post-commitment program days or credits for those reasons. Because the challenged conduct had been corrected and Purdy no longer had a concrete injury that the court could remedy, the court concluded that this portion was moot. It also found that no exception to mootness applied.

The court did not decide whether Purdy was entitled to earn credits at the higher rate of 15 days for every 30 days of successful programming. The record contained conflicting dates and descriptions of Purdy’s risk assessments, and the Bureau’s records did not clearly explain why his rate changed from 10 days to 15 days. The warden’s written statements also appeared inconsistent with the records, including statements about Purdy’s eligibility to apply his credits.

The court therefore ordered the warden to file updated Bureau records showing Purdy’s First Step Act status, all risk-assessment dates and scores beginning in March 2022, the date he began earning credits at the 15-day rate, what caused the change, and explanations for inconsistencies in the records and the warden’s filings. The warden also had to state whether the Bureau continued to interpret the statute as requiring one initial risk determination and two later reassessments before an inmate could earn 15 credits for every 30 days. Purdy was permitted to respond.

Other Requested Relief

The court recommended denying the petition to the extent it relied on Purdy’s alleged “18 months” policy. Purdy offered no evidence that the policy existed or was being applied to him, and the Bureau’s cited program statement did not contain such a restriction.

The court recommended denying Purdy’s request to apply his earned credits immediately. Even using an assumption favorable to Purdy—that he earned credits at the 15-day rate from his commitment to FCI-Sandstone—the court calculated that his credits still did not equal the remaining portion of his sentence, as required before the credits could be applied under the statute. The court also rejected Purdy’s argument that the Bureau had to apply the credits every 30 days.

The court recommended denying Purdy’s due-process and liberty-interest claims concerning the Bureau’s failure to combine First Step Act credits and good-conduct credits in calculating a projected release date. It explained that the two types of credits arise under different statutory systems and that First Step Act credits are conditional and may be lost in certain circumstances.

The court also recommended denying relief seeking transfer to a residential reentry center or home confinement. It found that Purdy had no protected liberty interest in placement at a particular facility, that the record showed an individualized review under the Second Chance Act, and that the Bureau retained authority over prisoner placement.

Emergency Motions and Final Recommendations

The court recommended denying both Purdy’s Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction and his Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. It concluded that Purdy had not shown a sufficient likelihood of success on most of his claims, irreparable harm, a favorable balance of harms, or that the public interest supported immediate transfer.

The court stated that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary at that time, but it would decide whether one was needed on the earning-rate claim after receiving the updated records.

Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright’s filing was an Order and Report and Recommendation, not a final district-court judgment. The notice stated that it was not directly appealable to the Court of Appeals and that the parties could file written objections under the applicable local rule.