Nicholas C. v. Kijakazi

Background

Nicholas C. applied for Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits on June 5, 2020. He alleged that he became disabled on April 30, 2020, because of mental-health conditions including anxiety disorder, depression, and bipolar disorder. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing at which Nicholas C. testified and was represented by an attorney, an administrative law judge determined that he had severe anxiety, mood, personality, substance-use, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorders.

The administrative law judge found that Nicholas C.’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. The judge determined that Nicholas C. had the residual functional capacity—the most he could still do in a work setting—to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to restrictions including simple, routine, repetitive tasks; a low-stress environment; and only occasional interaction with the public and coworkers. Although Nicholas C. could not return to his past work, the administrative law judge found that he could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and concluded that he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review.

The Court’s Review

The court reviewed the decision to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. If the record could support two inconsistent views and one of them supports the administrative law judge’s findings, the court must affirm those findings.

Listing-Level Impairment

Nicholas C. argued that the administrative law judge erred by finding that his mental-health conditions did not meet Listings 12.04, 12.06, or 12.08. He specifically argued that he satisfied the paragraph C “marginal adjustment” criteria under Listings 12.04 and 12.06. Those criteria require, among other things, a serious and persistent mental disorder and minimal ability to adapt to changes or demands outside the person’s ordinary daily life.

The court noted that Nicholas C. did not challenge the paragraph A requirements or appear to challenge the finding that he did not meet the paragraph B requirements. He pointed to evidence supporting his position but did not argue that the record lacked evidence supporting the administrative law judge’s conclusion. The court held that the administrative law judge’s decision thoroughly addressed the mental-health evidence and had more than substantial evidentiary support. The court rejected this argument. The court also noted that Listing 12.08 has only paragraphs A and B and does not contain a paragraph C.

Absenteeism and Residual Functional Capacity

Nicholas C. also argued that the residual functional capacity assessment should have accounted for significant absenteeism because he sometimes attended therapy several times per week and was hospitalized once during the relevant period.

The court explained that residual functional capacity considers a person’s ability to perform sustained work activities on a regular and continuing basis. It also requires consideration of treatment-related effects, including treatment frequency, duration, disruption to routine, and medication side effects. But Nicholas C. identified no evidence showing that his appointments would necessarily interfere with a work schedule or require him to miss entire workdays. He also identified no opinion evidence indicating that his impairments or treatment would likely cause him to miss a number of workdays each month. Because he had not met his burden to establish excessive absenteeism, the court rejected this argument.

Disposition

The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s determination that Nicholas C. was not disabled. It ordered that Nicholas C.’s motion for summary judgment be denied, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and the matter be dismissed with prejudice. The court directed entry of judgment.