Paris F. F. v. Kijakazi

Background

Paris F. F. challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for supplemental security income. She alleged disability beginning in June 2019 based, among other things, on agoraphobia, depression, and anxiety. The administrative law judge found severe impairments of generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and major depressive disorder, but concluded that they did not meet or equal a listed impairment.

The administrative law judge determined that Paris had the residual functional capacity—the most she could do despite her impairments—to perform work at all physical exertion levels, subject to limits for simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; simple work-related decisions; occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; and only occasional workplace changes. The judge found that Paris could perform her past work as a laundry laborer and kitchen helper and could alternatively perform jobs such as cleaner, change-house attendant, and linen-room attendant. The judge therefore found that she was not disabled. Paris did not challenge the administrative law judge’s determination concerning her eligibility for disability insurance benefits based on statutory blindness.

Issues and Analysis

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to decide whether the administrative law judge’s decision complied with the law and was supported by substantial evidence. Paris argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated the opinion of Joyce Southers, a mental-health provider, and failed to account for the state agency psychological consultants’ opinion that Paris could handle only brief, infrequent, and superficial contact with coworkers and the public.

The court rejected Paris’s challenge to the evaluation of Southers’s opinion. Southers had identified numerous marked limitations, including limitations involving concentration, attendance, maintaining a routine, responding to criticism, working with others, and tolerating ordinary workplace stress. The administrative law judge found the opinion unpersuasive, unsupported, and inconsistent with the evidence. The court concluded that the administrative law judge adequately explained the opinion’s lack of support and inconsistency with treatment findings, other providers’ observations, and Paris’s reported activities. The court stated that the administrative law judge was permitted to find the opinion less persuasive when it was inconsistent with Southers’s own treatment notes and the broader record.

The court reached a different conclusion about the social-interaction limitation. It explained that “occasional” contact concerns the amount of time spent interacting with others, while “superficial” contact concerns the quality of those interactions. The administrative law judge found the state agency consultants’ findings generally persuasive, but did not clearly state whether the superficial-contact limitation was rejected or how the limitation to occasional contact accounted for it.

The court also declined to accept explanations supplied by the Commissioner’s lawyers that were not given by the administrative law judge. Because the administrative law judge relied on vocational-expert testimony based on a hypothetical that did not include a superficial-contact limitation, the court could not determine whether the job findings rested on a potentially incomplete hypothetical.

Disposition

The court ordered further proceedings so the administrative law judge could explain whether the state agency consultants’ superficial-contact limitation should be adopted, rejected, or incorporated into the residual functional capacity through the existing limitation to occasional contact. The administrative law judge could also obtain additional vocational-expert testimony or explain whether the identified jobs required only superficial contact.

The order expressly states that Paris F. F.’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings.