Sara Z. v. Kijakazi

Background

Sara Z. applied for disability insurance benefits in December 2019, alleging that her disability began in May 2019. She identified several impairments, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia, peripheral neuropathy, arthritis, right-foot problems, insomnia, chronic widespread pain, extreme fatigue, and bilateral tinnitus.

The Social Security Administration denied the application initially and again on reconsideration. After a September 2021 hearing, an administrative law judge found that Sara Z. was not disabled. The appeals council denied further review. Sara Z. then sought judicial review, and both parties moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to rule based on the record when there is no genuine dispute requiring a trial.

Report and Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung recommended granting in part and denying in part Sara Z.’s motion for summary judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. The recommendation called for remand to the administrative law judge on three issues:

The Commissioner objected to the recommended remand.

Court’s Analysis

Judge Doty reviewed the objections and the recommendation independently. The court also reviewed the administrative law judge’s decision under the substantial-evidence standard, which asks whether the record contains enough evidence that a reasonable person could find it adequate to support the decision.

The court rejected the Commissioner’s arguments about Dr. Lichtsinn’s opinion. Although the opinion was written after Sara Z. was last insured, the court concluded that it addressed her condition during the relevant period. The court also disagreed that the opinion was merely a checkbox form, explaining that Dr. Lichtsinn provided a detailed narrative about Sara Z.’s tearfulness and likely absenteeism. The court further found that the record was inconsistent regarding whether those issues could be addressed effectively in the workplace and that it was unclear how Sara Z. could work under the scenarios described in the administrative law judge’s decision if Dr. Lichtsinn’s opinion received any weight.

The court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the administrative law judge was not required to explain the reliance on the state-agency opinions. The applicable regulation requires the administrative law judge to explain how she considered the supportability and consistency of a medical source’s opinions. Because the Commissioner did not identify such an explanation in the decision, the court held that remand was required.

Disposition

The court overruled the Commissioner’s objection and adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety. It granted in part and denied in part Sara Z.’s motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, as set forth in the report and recommendation.

The court affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision as to steps one through four, except regarding consideration of Dr. Lichtsinn’s opinions about Sara Z.’s tearfulness and absenteeism and the state-agency medical consultants’ opinions about her physical functioning. The court vacated the decision as to step five and remanded the matter to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the opinion and report and recommendation. Judge David S. Doty directed that judgment be entered accordingly.