Daywitt v. Harpstead

Background

Kenneth Steven Daywitt is subject to involuntary civil commitment at a Minnesota Sex Offender Program facility in St. Peter, Minnesota. He sued Jodi Harpstead, identified as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and Nancy Johnston, identified as the program’s executive director. He sued both defendants in their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that permits claims against state actors for violating constitutional rights.

Daywitt challenged the program’s Client Tier Level System. Adopted in October 2017, the five-level system gives patients different privileges and restrictions. Tier 1 is the most restrictive. Patients can advance to higher tiers only after meeting stated requirements, and Daywitt alleged that he had been moved from Tier 3 to Tier 2 three times after receiving major Behavioral Expectation Reports.

Daywitt’s complaint alleged violations of equal protection and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, unlawful punishment, inadequate appeal procedures, double jeopardy, and Minnesota Administrative Rule 9544.0060. He did not pay the filing fee and instead applied to proceed without paying it, so the complaint was screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires dismissal of an unpaid complaint that fails to state a claim.

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation and Objections

United States Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty recommended dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. He concluded that the complaint did not adequately allege a viable federal claim and that the state-law claim should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

For the backward-looking due-process claim, the recommendation found that Daywitt’s tier reductions followed Behavioral Expectation Reports and that the procedures used for those reports had previously been found constitutionally sufficient. Daywitt did not allege that officials failed to follow those procedures.

For the broader challenge to the tier policy itself, the recommendation concluded that Daywitt had not plausibly alleged that the policy lacked adequate procedures. The complaint acknowledged that patients could use a grievance process to challenge a tier reduction. The recommendation rejected Daywitt’s argument that appeals were constitutionally inadequate merely because they were handled within the program rather than by an outside entity.

The recommendation also concluded that patients who violated institutional rules were not similarly situated to patients who did not; that the tier policy was reasonably related to legitimate therapeutic or institutional interests; and that double jeopardy did not apply because the complaint did not allege criminal punishment. It recommended dismissing the Minnesota-law claim without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal claims.

District Court’s Analysis

Judge Menendez reviewed the portions of the recommendation to which Daywitt specifically objected without deferring to the recommendation. The court gave Daywitt’s objections a liberal reading because he represented himself, but agreed that the complaint failed to state a plausible federal claim.

The court rejected Daywitt’s objection that earlier approval of the Behavioral Expectation Report procedures could not support dismissal because the tier policy was adopted later. The court explained that the claim concerning his prior tier reductions was based on reductions following Behavioral Expectation Reports, and the procedures used for those reports had already been found sufficient. The court therefore approved dismissal of that due-process claim.

The court also rejected Daywitt’s facial due-process challenge to the tier policy. Although the complaint referred to protected interests in privileges and a gaming controller, the court focused on the failure to plausibly allege inadequate procedural safeguards. The court held that the complaint did not show that the policy’s grievance process was constitutionally inadequate. It specifically rejected the argument that an internal appeal process is necessarily unconstitutional because outside authorities do not decide the appeals.

The equal-protection claim also failed. The court concluded that the policy differentiated between patients who had violated institutional rules and received disciplinary reports and those who had not. Those groups were not similarly situated for purposes of the challenged treatment.

The court rejected the unlawful-punishment claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege that the tier policy was unrelated to legitimate therapeutic or institutional interests. It rejected the double-jeopardy claim because the complaint did not allege multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. The court also found that Daywitt’s references in his objections to possible retaliation were too conclusory to state a retaliation claim that had not been clearly pleaded in the complaint.

Disposition

The court accepted the Report and Recommendation and overruled Daywitt’s objections. It dismissed the action without prejudice as follows: all federal-law claims were dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and all state-law claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court also denied Daywitt’s application to proceed without paying the filing fee and directed that judgment be entered.